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VOLUME I NUMBER I

THE TREATMENT OF PERSONALITY BY LOCKE, BERKELEY AND HUME

A Study, in the Interests of Ethical Theory, of an Aspect of the Dialectic of English Empiricism

BY
JAY WILLIAM HUDSON, Ph. D.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
COLUMBIA, MISSOURI
May, 1911

Monograph

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PREFACE

This essay represents the substance of a thesis accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Although chiefly expository, it is written from the standpoint of constructive criticism. The standpoint itself was earned during a long apprenticeship in philosophy under Professor George Holmes Howison, of the University of California, who, the writer thinks, is one of the most significant of those contemporary philosophers who have made personality the fundamental problem of metaphysics. That the pupil has since modified the viewpoint of his master in important particulars need not concern the reader in connection with the present study. The writer's total metaphysical doctrine, so far as he has any, is not obtruded here save by suggestion.

All references to Locke's *Essay,* as well as to Berkeley's *Works,* are to the editions edited by A. C. Fraser, unless otherwise noted. All references to Hume's *Treatise* are to the Selby-Bigge edition. Other references are self-explanatory. Portions of citations are italicized where emphasis is desirable and where no perversion of meaning is involved.

J. W. H.

University of Missouri, May, 1911.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Conception of the Person as related to Ethical Theory

A casual glance at modern ethical systems reveals their use of such notions as: Ideal, Right, Wrong, Obligation, Responsibility, Freedom, and a number of closely allied conceptions which are usually given a meaning, however attenuated, in ethical systems which claim adequacy. Certain other conceptions, whose names have come to be applied to familiar types of ethical theories, find their place in any systematic pronouncements; and their disposal usually indicates the general character of the system. Among such conceptions are: Egoism, Altruism, Publicism, Hedonism, Rationalism, and the like.

In dealing with fundamental ethical conceptions such as have been mentioned, the simplest fact of all concerning them has often been neglected. In ethical discussion they are frequently treated as merely abstract conceptions; whereas their true significance is as determinations of *persons,*—indeed one might call them *predicates of ethical personality.* For instance, it is not with Responsibility with which we have to do primarily, but with responsible persons; not with Freedom as an airy something with a name, but with free persons. And so Obligation has no meaning apart from obliged persons. The Ideal is always the ideal of a person,—indeed, it itself may prove to be a person. And as for Right and Wrong, nothing is ever right or wrong in the last resort but persons, however fitly we may apply these terms, in a secondary sense, to particular courses of conduct. And so Hedonism has to do with persons as happy, and Rational-

ism with rational persons; while Egoism and Altruism directly refer to a world of persons, each with its own peculiar emphasis. We deal not with Morality, but with moral persons, whose morality is with reference to persons. In short, and above all, our question is never just "What is ethics?" Most truly stated, it is *"What is the ethical person?"*

When this is once said, it all seems so very obvious that one suspects that it is hardly worth while to say it. And yet, one has only to read ethical discussions to find that this fundamental personal reference of all ethical conceptions has frequently been forgotten, and that, as a result, these discussions often wander from the vital point, and never irrefragably attain their goal,—however well they play at the game of abstractions. For instance, to cite a conspicuous case, which will have prominent place in this essay, the history of the discussion concerning freedom reveals a series of controversies over what freedom means in the abstract; what a free "will" is; what a free "volition" is; what a free "motive" is; only rarely is the genuine question seriously asked,—"What is a free person?" or, "On what conditions is a free person possible?" And yet this seemingly small change in the putting of the problem transforms the real character of the search and makes the arguments of the ordinary free-will controversy seem trivially foreign to the final issue.

With this discovery of the common personal reference, resident in all fundamental ethical conceptions, it is also hinted that the logically validating ground of them which we seek is to be found in a finally self-sustaining doctrine of the person. One might add that in the nature of the person we may discover precisely that principle of definition, of unity, and of consistency among these conceptions which becomes the indication of what we must rationally mean by an adequate ethical system, as well as the sufficient critique of all inadequate ethical theories.

What is the logical *sine qua non* of the ethical person?—that is, a person which shall guarantee freedom, responsibility, ideals, and all the rest of the supposed attributes of ethical personality? Further, is such a person a reality, or is he a mere dream of ethical speculation? Is there any way that such an ethical person can be irrefutably proved? Or, to sum both questions in a form reminiscent of Kant: How is an ethical person possible? It is obvious at the very start that ethics cannot avoid metaphysics, if it is to answer the question in a real sense,—at least the ethical theorist must not be loth to carry his quest into ultimate regions, if nothing short of that will satisfy his search. If it cannot be shown that ethical persons are real, and, we are tempted to add, the ultimate reality, then there is no ethical world,—no ethics is genuinely possible.

It is well, in any such search for the validating ground of the ethical person, to select some one of the conceptions indispensable for ethics from among those noted and ask what sort of personality will guarantee it. If the ethical person thus discovered is also the only one that will guarantee this, presumably we shall have achieved an answer to the query: What is the ethical person? For the interdependence, the inter-reference, of fundamental ethical conceptions becomes apparent as soon as one attempts to work with them. And this interdependence is an indication that their logically validating ground is one and the same. If one seeks a conception which has presented great difficulties in the history of ethics, and yet which is acknowledged to be necessary, in some sense or other, to make ethics possible, the conception just now particularly instanced, that of freedom, conspicuously offers itself. It will always emerge that freedom cannot be discussed adequately without involving the other ethical notions; if this is true, the inter-reference and inter-validation of ethical conceptions is the more truly maintained.

The Ethical Person as a priori Knower

The question, then, What is ethical freedom? should be put in its genuine form, What is an ethically free person? Putting it in this way leads us far toward the answering of the question itself. With reference to this question, let us turn to certain deliverances of modern moralists of a prevailing school, who have come near to putting the question in the ultimate form which has been insisted upon. In that general school where evolution is made the universally reigning law, the question of whether actions, or volitions, or motives are free is often resolved to the deeper question of whether these acts, motives, volitions, belong to the "agent" in some sense or other,—of whether the agent himself is free "in some sense or other". So far, good. But, obviously, the whole question is, *which* "sense or other" is the one that will guarantee any real freedom, a freedom that makes the agent's act really and finally "his own," and which thus gives him that moral responsibility in whose interest is any search for freedom at all. Now, in the school referred to, what is usually meant by saying that the agent is free is that he is not moved entirely from without, but also from within; that there is a reaction of an inner influence upon extraneous influences. It is explained that each man has an inner necessity as well as an outer necessity; that he has a character of his own. His brain does not merely receive, but it transforms excitations. A man is free in so far as he is not coerced by anything outside himself. In this sense he may be said to mold his own future.

An objection might be made (the hint of a more significant objection to be made presently) that a snowflake, a book, a street-car, is free in the sense of having an inner as well as an outer necessity, and that in this sense each "molds its own future." But that is the freedom (if freedom it is) of mere *things;* but surely we discriminate a freedom of *persons* from that of mere things. Some moralists of the general type we are considering,

when pressed for the distinction between the freedom of men and of things, answer that man indeed has a freedom that things and animals (at least, as we conceive them) have not. The difference is this: animals are moved to action by momentary impulses, while man determines himself by ideas of ends. His life is made a purpose, a unity; and all momentary choices are subordinated to that.

When one says that he is free because he determines his life by the idea of a purpose, he has not finally guaranteed his freedom until he answers the crucial question: *Who, or what, in the last resort, determines your purpose?* Is your purpose really and finally your own, or is it determined for you? We may conceive most evolutionists as replying that one's purpose is determined not only by the character of one's environment but by his "inner necessity", or "character of his own", which latter consideration, as we have just seen, is, in general, sufficient to satisfy the evolutionist's notion of freedom, so far as such a notion is possible at all. But suppose that a man is free in so far as he has a character of his own (and no one will deny such a general statement), or, as he has an inner influence which must be accounted with along with the extraneous influences called "environment", one cannot rest satisfied in any serious search for free personality until it is guaranteed that a person's character is really and ultimately "his own" and is not merely *the product of a process.* We come now to a vital query: Strictly in the world of efficient causation, in the world of time and space, taken as the only world there is, are free persons possible in that logically ultimate sense that carries with it moral responsibility? In short, does nature, as such, give us in all her realm an ethically free person?

When the logic of science is asked this question fairly and unequivocally it answers: Science, in any real sense, is made possible only with the supposition that there is no such thing as

an uncaused process either in the physical or psychical sphere. There is no reason for making an exception of human willing, or even of the human mind as a whole. It, too, is caught in the causal nexus of the Cosmic Whole. The fact is, science tolerates no exceptions. Suppose we agreed with Professor James that we are not always able to detect the precise causal nexus in subtler regions of psychology, this would be no reason for supposing chance, which he himself would admit, although he espouses chance on other grounds. Where science is not able to find causes, she must, perforce imagine them present, even though their discovery be practically impossible. This is the only rational alternative. For observe, the scientific investigation even of mind seems to show uniformity of action. Under the same circumstances the same states occur. If this were not so, experimental psychology could not be a science at all. But if one is still in doubt as to the absolute determination of all acts, all volitions, in short, of all that pertains even to minds, by the iron necessity of causal law, one need but consider all in the light of science's modern conception of evolution. Then, if not until then, we see that we are not only dependent upon nature, but *all that we are is derived from nature.* What we are can be accounted for by the causal chain, nor can we say that we could have been otherwise. All is determined. Our parentage, and hence our inheritance,—this, at least, is no matter for choice; nor is our time and place of birth, our sex, the peculiarities of the family and of the people among whom we find ourselves, their language, their customs, their church, their politics, their society, and their place in that society. Our education reflects the general culture and ideals of our particular times. Through all the seven ages, from the infant in the nurse's arms to the "last scene of all that ends this strange eventful history" in "second childishness and mere oblivion," there is no break in the causal chain; man's birth is a product; his career a

product; and to both, as to death, his only liberty is to submit; he is a part, and only a part, of the total life of humanity, and finally of universal nature.

Thus, when that science, whose world is the world of space and time and efficient causation, is asked whether her persons are free or determined, she answers unequivocally that all the persons she knows are, in the last resort, determined. Persons are denied as ultimately responsible, as ultimately real, and so as ultimately ethical.

To many moderns this is, indeed, the conclusion of the whole matter. And it is a valid conclusion so far as we have gone. But can we not go farther in our search? Rather, must we not go farther if we follow the lead of that very logic which has made our world of science possible? Our whole question at once becomes this: Is there a realm other than that of natural science? If so, we can at least renew our thwarted search for free persons.

All the laws of science's world purport to be generalizations from observed spaced and timed "facts", the supreme generalization of all being in terms of the law of Universal Causation. But precisely what is "causation," "'space," and "time;" and, above all, what makes generalization itself possible? Here we come to the Kantian questions. Science explains away the free person, but how is science itself explicable? What guarantees its basal assumptions? If science is self-explanatory, it behooves science to show this. If its assumptions can be explained only by principles, themselves beyond the world of natural science, then perhaps we shall have a realm in the light of which the arguments of science concerning persons will not appear so final, and indeed may have to be essentially revised.

The fact is of course that science as such utterly fails to account for space and time. To say that they are products of evolution, or generalizations from experience, is to ignore the

fact that they are presuppositions for the possibility both of experience and its interpretation in evolutional terms. They are logically "prior" to experience,—*a priori* forms in short, forms which the experiencer himself contributes to his world of experience as constitutive of it. The logic of time and space, if we follow the interpretation of Kant, leads us to a new and significant conception of persons as *a priori* knowers. But, even apart from the consideration of time and space, granting them for the moment as valid assumptions, the conception of any universal and necessary causal nexus, assumed in all science, is wholly unwarranted by mere experience in time and space. For how, on the basis of what occurs in time and space, can one rise to universal laws at all? How can one say that what has been is a criterion of what is to be? One cannot verify a universal law by any particular experience; one can say only that he has found another *example* of it. No necessary judgments, causal or other, can be accumulated in the course of time. The series is never complete, and if it were complete, the element of necessity would still be lacking. One can maintain the validty of universal judgments only when he conceives the person as an *a priori* knower, a person who is the very source of that necessity which he discovers in nature. Before asking whether the conception of the person as *a priori* knower is identical with the free person in any real sense, it is crucially important for the doctrine of ethical personality to see that *no person at all, free or otherwise, is possible to any but an a priori epistemology.*

The Dialectic of Empiricism in English Thought

Still, that philosophers by no means are agreed upon such a pronouncement as this must be admitted. The case of a typical school of evolutional moralists has just been cited. Modern Pragmatism, with its radical empiricism and open denial of the *a priori* would be far from confessing that it has no ethics; in-

deed, its very name would seem to connote an overwhelming emphasis upon "truth" as in a sense fundamentally ethical in its import and test. And there have been conspicuous attempts in the history of philosophy, to guarantee a person of some sort through a purely empiristic epistemology.

Indeed, we sometimes find the dialectic of pure logic very strikingly exemplified in philosophy's concrete development, notwithstanding the frequent attacks upon the general Hegelian thesis concerning logic and history. Where the logical dialectic is thus concretely presented, a twofold advantage occurs to the philosopher from taking careful cognizance of the living drama; mutual light is thrown upon the essential meaning of the historic denouement itself and upon the full significance of the purely logical development particularly exemplified. Hegel himself strikingly exhibited the value of this illustrative dialectic in his early. *The Phenomenology of the Spirit,* as well as in his later works. Now, if it is true that only the doctrine of the self as *a priori* knower can guarantee ethical personality, this ought to appear in the self-defeat of any particular concrete empiristic attempt to maintain a doctrine of the person. If only one could find an actual historic attempt of this kind, persistent and thorough-going enough to carry the merely empirical guarantees of personality to the utter goal of their own full meaning, one would discover a philosophical movement well worth minute review for its own sake, as well as for the sake of the final theory of the ethical person. In the examination of such a movement any insufficiency of empiricism in this regard would soon emerge in the inevitable exposure of fundamental contradictions and of inadequate conceptions.

It can hardly be doubted that it is in the history of English thought that one finds the most striking modern instances of persistent attempts to construct metaphysics upon an empiristic basis. And in all English thought there has never been a better

exhibition of the logical bearings of empiricism upon the fortunes of the person than in the writings of that notable and vitally related succession of philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. No succession of thinkers has so thoroughly expressed the strength and limitations of the characteristically English mode of thinking; and this is made no less apparent by the fact that no Englishmen have had so appreciable an influence upon the total development of later English philosophy. Above all, no English thinkers have treated the problem of personality so strikingly and so fully: and this too, within empiristic presuppositions. Further, the interest of each of these men was to achieve the vindication of an ethical person: a person that should be morally accountable. Here, then, if anywhere, is to be found the historic dialectic of empiricism with relation to the special problem of ethical personality.

Aim of this Essay

The aim of this essay is three-fold. *First,* it attempts carefully to gather from the sources and to marshal into coherency the more or less detached utterances of Locke, Berkeley and Hume concerning human personality. First of all, such a task should bear in mind that while each of these philosophers has something explicit to say on the subject, no one of them made the question of the ultimate nature and reality of persons his central and determining problem. Thus it is not unreasonable to expect more or less inconsistencies emerging as the result of any attempt to gather together their views on this subject. The first prerequisite for the success of the attempt is that sympathetic spirit, which, in seeking the general view of a thinker, ignores for the time any lurking contradictions, which, nevertheless, will be brought to light in the proper place.

Now, if *a priori* knowledge is in reality the true presupposition of ethical personality, we shall expect that logic will compel to emerge from the views of each thinker one, at least, of two predicaments: first, the more or less tacit assumption of the *a priori* in some guise; second, in the absence of such a tacit assumption, an inner contradiction which calls for the *a priori* as its solution. The latter situation will be found to be Hume's. As a matter of fact, both situations emerge in the views of Locke and Berkeley.

Thus the *second* aim of this essay is to discover the place of the *a priori,* explicit or implied, in the treatment of personality by Locke, Berkeley and Hume. We may find some of these philosophers, Locke, for instance, less empiristic than is very commonly supposed. And at all events it is uniquely profitable to see in what manner the *a priori* emerges with thinkers who have not yet recognized the true question as it has appeared since Kant

The *third* aim of this essay is to exhibit, by a historical dialectic represented in our three thinkers taken together, the gradual and final self-dissolution of empiricism in its specific attempt to guarantee personality. Just these three men are chosen because they exhibit in their succession, as will be shown, a dialectic intimate and continuous.

To summarize in one sentence, our three-fold task is: to present the treatment of personality by Locke, Berkeley and Hume, especially with reference to the place of the *a priori* in that treatment, with the subsidiary aim of showing by a sort of illustrative dialectic, in each case and together, the necessity of the *a priori* for any personality such as they tried to guarantee, and such as is adequate for ethics. Thus our aim is plainly a restricted one. The working out of a total ethics or metaphysics is the least of the intention. The most that can be essayed is to indicate one logical condition which such a total view must ob-

serve—the logical condition of rational self-activity, in the sense of *a priori* cognition.

I may forecast here that we shall find that Locke, empiricist that he is, inevitably assumes *a priori* elements to make even his persons possible at all. Berkeley, whom I shall hold to be an even more radical empiricist, and so on that side showing more clearly the dialectic of empiricism, yet calls in, for that very reason, more evident *a priori* assumptions than Locke, and these of a vicious sort, so that the inconsistency of his position and the insufficiency of his empiricism becomes still more apparent We shall then come to the final self-refutation of the empiristic view of personality,—a self-refutation which is the significance of Hume, who furnishes empiricism its own dialectic by consistently carrying it out even to its utter contradiction,—which plunges him into scepticism simply because he does not see how the contradiction can be rationally transcended.

Apart from the motive adduced from the fact of the evident bearing of *a priori* cognition upon the fortunes of personality, there are other cogent reasons for supposing that a philosopher's epistemological utterances, more directly than his utterances on any other theme, settle what he must hold concerning the human person, and that thus our epistemological approach is the most fruitful one we could choose.

Apart from other grounds, this much is evident at once in favor of the epistemological approach: epistemology as such assumes and treats persons in some sense as *knowers,* that is, in some sense as *minds,* even though this assumption be afterwards denied as untenable; it directly answers the question within what meaning persons are rational; and in its decision as to whether we can know reality at all, it decides at the same time, however unwittingly, whether we can vindicate the person as real.

I add that the epistemological approach commends itself as especially happy in an examination of English thought when we

remember that it is one of the characteristics of English philosophy to make its problem epistemological, rather than ontological. This is the significant quest of Locke's *Essay;* and it sounds an emphasis that has appeared throughout all English speculation,—becoming England's supreme contribution to continental thinking.

CHAPTER II

LOCKE'S VIEW OF PERSONALITY

We approach Locke conscious of a double interest at the very start. For not only is he the originator of a new tendency, a new epoch, by his broaching of the epistemological question as primary, but since an answer to this very question is most vital to our quest, we feel sanguine that here that quest will not be fruitless.

Since Berkeley finds the logical genesis of his own system in aspects of that of Locke, a more than cursory examination of the latter is imperative in order really to comprehend the former. We recognize a further importance attaching to a study of Locke's treatment of personality when we remember that in his general outlook he represents the popular common sense not only of his day, but of our own. Thus, in examining the philosopher whose *Essay* ran into over forty editions in a century, we shall also have the advantage of revealing the implications of the popular consciousness of the English people.

I might add that we shall have to pay dearly for this advantage, for the popularity of the *Essay* was made possibly partly by its being couched in the inexact language of every-day life,—which of course begot obscurities and difficulties in the way of precise interpretation, and that, with regard to important issues. The difficulty which has beset commentators should serve from the first to warn us not to be too literal in pressing home the logic of some of Locke's statements. We should seek to deserve the commendation which Locke wrote to Anthony Collins: "You have a *comprehensive* knowledge of it (the *Essay*), and do not stick in the incidents, which I find many people do."

For one who is not chiefly concerned with questions regarding personality, Locke wrote a surprising amount of matter directly on the subject. In the *Essay,* these direct utterances are found principally in three chapters of Book II, Chapter XXI, "Of Power," where the subject of freedom is discussed; Chapter XXIII, "Of the Complex Ideas of Substances"; and Chapter XXVII, "Of Identity and Diversity." Besides these chapters should be mentioned Chapter IX of Book IV, "Of our Knowledge of Existence." But scattered all through the *Essay* are found important statements directly pertaining to our theme. Nor can Locke's other works be ignored, notably the utterances brought forth by the attacks of critics.

That "I exist" is to Locke an intuitive certainty. In some of his phrases we are dimly reminded of Descartes, whom Locke greatly admired, as is evident from the testimony of Lady Masham and from the frequent mention of Descartes in Locke's letters to Stillingfleet. And while Locke obviously did not sound the real meaning of the *"Cogito ergo sum"* even so well as did its author, still the following passage sounds like a muffled echo of Descartes: "As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence: I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain; can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? *If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence* . . . Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence and an internal infallible perception that we are" (*Essay,* IV, ix. § 3).

After all, the assurance of our own existence is with Locke a verdict of our *experience* rather than the result of the dialectic which is concealed in the Cartesian statement. It is a certainty discovered in the course of the search for the origin of ideas,—a search which reveals that origin as Sensation, on the one hand,

and Reflection on the other. While Sensation furnishes us with the certainty of substances outside ourselves, Reflection furnishes us with a certainty of our own individual substance, or self. We frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit "by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, etc., coexisting in some substance." "And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material. For by putting together "those ideas" joined with substance . . . we have the idea of an immaterial spirit" (II, xxiii, § 15). The second edition of the *Essay* adds: "Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of *both* parts of nature—the corporeal and the spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, that there is some corporeal being *without* me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being *within* me that sees and hears."

Thus, whatever limits Locke will find imposed upon the understanding, the existence in some sort of the mind itself is among the few unconditional certainties which may be dignified with the name of "knowledge"; indeed, in the passage above cited, "my existence" is treated as the logically primary certainty, to which experience bears witness even "more" indubitably than to anything else. Perhaps the implications of Locke's treatment will destroy the soul as the primary certainty in any real sense. But from beginning to end the *Essay* is pervaded with the presupposition of the two substances, "outer substance" and "inner substance"; so that to think of Locke at all is to think of him in terms of this intuitive faith.

And now we come to some characteristically Lockean statements. We may as well realize at once that with Locke's general

point of view, content to base itself upon a strong faith in the verdicts of common sense, questions subtle, though none the less important, will remain unanswered, and from his standpoint unanswerable. In being told merely that "I exist," we are not yet satisfied. We say: the bare certainty that I really exist is interesting and fundamentally important; but we press for answers to ulterior questions involved in this certainty. *What,* essentially, is this self that you say you are certain really exists, and how, indeed, do you define "real existence?"

In propounding such questions to Locke we immediately become aware that the certainty of the self is not a primary certainty in the sense of a logical first principle—a source-principle from which other certainties shall receive their valid derivation. In this we see a contrast between Locke and Descartes: for the latter did make an attempt, however abortive, to deduce other certainties from the nature of the irrefutable primal certainty, and did insist that the establishing of the self at once put him in possession of the essence of the self as "thinking." Locke strongly intimates that he cannot regard thinking as the "essence" of the self, but prefers to call it the "action" of the soul. For thought sometimes suspends itself, as in sound sleep; but while "the *operations* of agents will easily admit of intention and remission, . . . the *essences* of things are not conceived capable of any such variation" (II, xix, § 4). Thus it is not that thinking *is* our substance, but it *belongs* to our substance to think. It is no more necessary to suppose that the human soul is always thinking than that bodies always move. God, indeed, may think always—He who "never slumbers nor sleeps"; but not so with human spirits (II, i, § 10). So Locke never conceives of a self-subsistent thinking in men, whatever may be said of God; thinking must ever "inhere" in something.

What the self is as substantial substrate Locke expressly tells us does not concern him. His attitude to this and other

ultimate questions, as that of a humility befitting merely human minds, is revealed in the quotation from Ecclesiastes placed on the title-page of the fourth edition of the *Essay*: "As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child; even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things" (Eccles. XI, 5). In announcing his design in the Introduction of the *Essay* he says that he will not trouble himself to examine wherein the essence of the mind consists, dismissing this as among the "speculations which, however curious and entertaining" he will decline as lying out of his way in the design he is now upon, namely, the "inquiry into the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds of belief, opinion, and assent." Whether Locke does not misconceive the nature of the epistemological task when he supposes he can dismiss as irrelevant to it the question regarding the nature of the knowing mind, I hope to point out later. In discussing the complex idea of immaterial substance, he characteristically speaks of it as "but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents" (II, xxiii, § 15). Again, "Of substance we have no idea of what it *is,* but only a confused, obscure one of what it *does*" (II, viii, § 19). Locke silences the clamors of him who complains that "he knows not what it is thinks in him," that is, who "knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing," by retorting, "No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing" (II, xxiii, § 23).

Locke will not even commit himself decisively as to whether the soul is "material" or "spiritual" substance. True it is he most often speaks of the soul as "immaterial spirit" and doubtless leans to this as the probable truth; yet he considers it not impossible that matter could be endowed by God with the power of thought. To deny it would be to impugn God's omnipotence, "it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from

our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking" (IV, iii, § 6).

This very point became a much mooted one between Locke and Stillingfleet, who criticised the above passage by saying that according to Locke's principles it could not be proved that there is a spiritual substance in us. To detail the highly interesting arguments in their correspondence is not necessary here, save to say that in his first letter, Locke grants that if the Bishop means by spiritual substance an immaterial substance, it cannot be proved, that is, demonstrated; though Locke hastens to add that he thinks it in the highest degree probable that the thinking substance in us is immaterial, and says that he would welcome with joy a conclusive demonstration, from the Bishop or anyone else. Locke's appeal is ever to the omnipotence of God, to whom he accuses the Bishop of setting bounds. To this omnipotence he reverts when, dissenting from the Bishop, he asserts that "All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality" (IV, iii, § 6). For even though we be material, God's power is great enough to annex immortality even to material substance. Locke cites: "For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." We are interested here merely in seeking Locke's view; in the proper place its bearings on personality will be considered.

If we cannot know what spiritual substance is, at least we can determine what qualities primarily "inhere" in it, just as we can determine the primary qualities of "body." The primary ideas peculiar to spirit are two: *thinking* and *willing,* the latter being "a power of putting body into motion by thought, and, which is consequent to it, liberty" (II, xxiii, § 18. cf. § 22, and xxi, § 75). How the soul can excite motion by thought is another

of Locke's admitted mysteries; but the fact of such imparting of motion is regarded as plain enough in anybody's experience. And its mystery need not especially harass us when we see that the communication of motion by bodies is equally unintelligible and yet equally a fact.

The powers of thinking and willing Locke elsewhere terms "faculties" under the names, Understanding and Will (II, vi). To these two primary ideas peculiar to spirit, Locke adds the ideas common to both matter and spirit, viz., existence, duration and mobility (II, xxiii, § 18). By "mobility" Locke means change of place. This attribute the soul must have in common with the body, for the soul, in this life at least, is united with the body; it must be where the body is, to operate on it; and where the body goes, there the soul also must go. And if this is not sufficient to convince, we still have the crucial argument, that the soul, in being separated from the body at death, leaves the body, which of course involves its motion. If anyone objects that spirits cannot change place because, as spirits, they are not *in loco,* he is simply speaking unintelligibly. If God doesn't move, it is not because He is a *spirit,* but because He is *infinite* (II, xxiii, §§ 19-20).

It is well to see that Locke does not hesitate to regard human spirits as finite in the sense that each has a definite beginning in time and place. So far as Locke's treatment goes, the soul is supposed to begin to exist with the body, although Locke will not commit himself on that point,—doubtlessly considering it irrelevant and at all events unascertainable. "Whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or sometime after the first rudiments of organization, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter" (II, i, § 10). It is easy to see that whether the soul exists before the body or not, Locke conceives it as timed and spaced. His idea of immortality is that of endless

continuance, belief in which he bases on revelation,—though we are made the creatures of God in this matter. Moreover the relation to the time and place of its existence always determines the *identity* of the finite spirit, "as long as it exists" (II, xxvii, § 2). Thus, when Locke essays to propound the *"principium individuationis,"* he names it as "existence itself; which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind" (II, xxvii, § 4). The reason why there can be no doubt of God's identity is that he endures through *all* time and is *everywhere.*

Thus far, the identity of the self as the same perduring *substance* has been considered; but another sense of identity is brought out by Locke,—the identity of the *person,* which Locke is explicit in saying need not be considered the same as identity of substance. In this sense the same self or *person* may or may not be continued in the same *substance* (II, xxvii, § 11). Locke's view on personal identity I shall cite as revealing a significant motive which runs all through the *Essay,* namely, the interest of Locke in guaranteeing "accountability" or moral responsibility. It is important to note that the chapter on "Identity and Diversity" is the result of Locke's maturer thought, being added to the second edition on the suggestion of Molyneux.

Towards the beginning of this chapter, Locke promises that it will prevent many difficulties if we see that it is one thing to be the same substance, and another thing to be the same person. Now, what does Locke mean by a "person" if not the "immaterial spirit?" He says he means "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places" (II, xxvii, § 11). *How* does this being "consider itself as itself?" Only by that *consciousness* which is inseparable from thinking, and essential to it. Since consciousness "makes everyone to be what he calls a Self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other

thinking beings, in this alone consists personal identity, *i. e.* the sameness of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person." All through the chapter this distinction between identity of *person* and identity of *substance* is maintained, as, when, toward the end, he reiterates that in all this account of the self, the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self, but the same continued consciousness (§ 26).

Of course the immediate difficulties involved in this account are obvious. Is personal identity to be limited to what is actually remembered, or to what is latent in memory?—is one query of commentators. Bishop Butler descends upon Locke with the comment: "One should think it self-evident that consciousness *presupposes* and cannot *constitute* personal identity." But however valid we shall find such criticisms in an ultimate verdict as to the worth of Locke's view, a most important thing here is to see that he earnestly desires to define personality in terms of moral accountability. Now, with Locke, a person is not an accountable person, and thus not a "person" at all in this restricted sense, any further than extends his appropriation of past actions to his present consciousness (II, xxvii, § 26). It is in this sense that consciousness "constitutes" [accountable] personality. No person can be justly punished, held accountable, for a deed which cannot be pressed home to his present consciousness as *his own.* To be punished for such an action is to be punished "without any demerit at all." "Whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong" (II, xxvii, § 16). But in the "last judgment," say, shall we be accountable for only those past actions which we appropriate in consciousness as our own? Yes, says Locke,—only "at the great day when everyone 'shall receive according to his doings, the secret of all hearts shall be laid open.' The sentence shall

be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that *they themselves* in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the *same* that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them" (II, xxvii, § 26).

This last sentence gives us a clue as to why Locke considers it necessary to make of substance-identity and personal identity separate questions. If he is to guarantee with any certainty a personal identity with moral accountability, he feels it must be freed from all speculations regarding the nature of the substance of the soul, for such speculations are uncertain in their issue: Locke thinks the human understanding impotent to decide them. He has already hinted that for aught we know soul-substance is material; and, if so, soul-substance continually changes, as do all bodies. But even so, Locke insists that his theory still affords us personal identity constituted by the appropriation of past acts in present consciousness, and "the *same* person is preserved *under the change of various substances.*"

Locke admits that his view of personal identity will probably look strange to some, and suggests that possibly it is strange in itself. Already has been cited an objection by Bishop Butler; among others taking part in this discussion were Sergeant, Stillingfleet, Lee, Clarke, Collins, Reid, and Vincent Perronet. But the view will lose a little of its "strangeness" if we keep in mind that Locke's real opinion all through the discussion is, that while we can and ought in all caution to distinguish between "personal" identity and the identity of soul-substance, the two identities are probably one. Thus, the consciousness which makes personal identity possible is probably "annexed to and the affection of one individual immaterial substance."

The interest Locke shows in making his views consistent with moral accountability lends especial interest to his discussion of freedom, which is the theme of the long chapter, "Of Power."

That he realized the importance of this problem in its theoretical and practical implications, and that it especially troubled him, is apparent in that part of the "Epistle to the Reader" added in the second edition. Here he states that, so far as he was able, he has tried to be accurate in treating this problem which has perplexed the learned in all ages and has such important bearings on "morality and divinity." But in spite of his efforts to be accurate; in spite of the material additions and corrections made in the second and later editions; and notwithstanding the manifest worth of many of his remarks, Locke is far from successful in giving us any consistent and well-defined view of freedom.

Without going into Locke's long and complicated exposition, I venture to say that so far as he gives us any freedom at all, it is the freedom of choice of alternatives. I am free in the sense that I can walk or sit, speak or remain silent, "*liberty consisting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only*" (II, xxi, § 24). I am not free to will or not to will; for instance, I must will either to walk or not to walk. But so far as I can choose between these alternatives, I am free (§ 23).

But what determines us to choose the particular alternative we do choose? Locke answers that it is satisfaction or dissatisfaction with our present "state or action." The motive to change is always some "uneasiness"; and by the most pressing present uneasiness Locke explicitly states the will is "determined" (§§ 29, 41). What does Locke mean by "uneasiness"? That which is desire, or is accompanied by desire for some absent good,—"good" which is to be taken in the sense of happiness; for, says Locke, "What has an aptness to produce pleasure in us that we call *good,* and what is apt to produce pain in us we call *evil*" (§ 43). The will, then, is moved by a desire for happiness, this desire accompanying or identical with a present uneasiness.

But in the second edition of the *Essay,* Locke, as he informs us in the "Epistle to the Reader," seeks to modify his view "con-

cerning that which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions." In this revision we are told that it is not the satisfaction of any particular desire that *immediately* determines the will; for we have the power of suspending such determination by the interposition of *deliberation,* which can examine "whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness" or is "consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man; who could not be free if his will were determined by anything but his own desire, *guided by his own judgment*" (§ 73). Webb (in *The Intellectualism of Locke,* p. 148) calls this the "liberty of self-suspense." It is a most valuable addition to Locke's treatment of the subject; at least it shows us that he sees the need of a deeper liberty than he at first defined. He seems very near indeed to a conception of genuine freedom that underlies and makes possible the mere freedom of alternatives when he writes such sentences as these: "Nay, were we determined by anything but the last result of our own minds judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free." "And therefore every man is put under a necessity, *by his constitution as an intelligent being,* to be determined in willing *by his own thought* and judgment what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination *of some other than himself, which is want of liberty*" (§ 49).

But how near Locke actually approaches any real freedom must not be hastily concluded from isolated passages, but must be considered with reference to the necessary implications of his general epistemological position. To find what is the inherent logic of Locke's *Essay* with regard to the freedom of the person as well as with regard to personality in general, is the deeper and subtler task we must next undertake. The attempt to marshal Locke's explicit statements on our subject may be con-

sidered as hardly more than introductory to this more profound search,—a search all the more necessary in the light of the subsequent history of philosophy. For after all, Locke has not touched explicitly questions vitally connected with the full meaning of personality. In our examination of logical implications we may find much that is at variance with what Locke thought he had a right explicitly to propound or without examination to assume

CHAPTER III

CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF LOCKE'S VIEW

It was said in the Introduction that in examining a philosopher's basic positions with regard to their ultimate bearings on ethical personality, it is convenient to narrow the problem by selecting some one essential "mark" of any personality that shall be called ethical and trace out the precise effects of the implications of his system upon the guaranteeing of this mark. And freedom was found to be a convenient concept of this sort. We have just been discussing Locke's view of freedom. Now Locke at least emphasizes what most will admit, and what the logic of any moral personality affirms, that freedom in some sense or other is necessary to constitute a person. If a person's thoughts and acts are to be his *own;* if he is to be held morally responsible; if in short he is to be a "self" at all, he himself must, in some sense, originate his thought and deed,—he must, in some sense, be free. It was hinted, too, in the Introduction, that freedom, bound up as it is with the other marks of real personality, carries with its own vindication the vindication of all other marks of the person, the ultimate vindication of personality and of all its marks being found in the proof of *a priori* cognition, together with the nature of its fundamental deliverance. Our historical study is yet to furnish an illustrative dialectic of this. Under the supposition that the vindication of a free personality depends upon the recognition of rational self-activity in the sense of *a priori* cognition, one would approach Locke with little doubt of the outcome. For is not Locke's characteristic position the denial of all innate ideas, and the counter-thesis

that all our ideas are derived from "experience,"—from external sense on the one hand, and from internal sense on the other? *All* ideas (and "idea" means "whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking") are adventitious. *"Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu."* The mind is originally an absolute blank, a "white paper," a *"tabula rasa"* upon which experience gradually writes its record. Or, again, it is a "dark room" says Locke: "for methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left to let in external visible resemblances or ideas of things without" (II, xi, § 17).

Complex ideas, ideas of Modes, Substance, Relation, may appear at first sight underivative from experience; but in the last resort they may be resolved to simple ideas; these are obviously experiential in their origin. To experience may be traced even those ideas which seem remotest from it,—such as Infinity, Power, Identity, and others of like character. Even "in our ideas as well of spirits as of other things, we are restricted to those we receive from sensation and reflection" (II, xxiii, § 36). This is true even of our idea of God. Yea, even in that which for Locke constitutes "knowledge," namely, the perception of "connexion or repugnancy, of agreement or disagreement" (IV, i, § 1), we are led to suppose that there is, properly speaking, no "act" of comparison, but just a passive receptivity. It is not a comparison *made,* but just a comparison *seen.*

Looking at Locke in this way we seem to discover an empiricist pure and simple. We are prone to consider his denial of innate ideas as tantamount to a denial of the *a priori.* Locke interpreted thus is the Locke who is the precursor of Hume; a Locke who, as a radical empiricist, can give us no necessary judgments,—but at best only loose, discontinuous, incomplete aggregates: who thus can give us no spontaneous self which makes eternal syntheses,—and so, of course, no freedom in this

sense. But Locke is not a radical empiricist, however Humeward sundry of his emphasized premises may lead if taken alone. You cannot "pigeon-hole" him so easily. Much of the historic appreciation and criticism of Locke has been abortive because of the desire, natural enough, but deadly to catholicity of interpretation,—the desire rigidly to classify him in the name of some precisely defined "school." In Locke will be found hints of many schools. As the high priest of a common sense however so subtle and cautious, Locke represents the breadth of common sense, along with the inconsistencies born of its largeness,—inconsistencies which, with Locke, are never reconciled, partially because never recognized. True enough we shall find in Locke a marked tendency, and that tendency is notably and broadly empiristic. But that tendency is not all there is, and we must not do him the violence of contorting all he says to fit that tendency. Of course Locke should have been consistent, but the fact remains that he was not. It is too late now to introduce a consistency into his writings and justly label it "Locke."

That he could not be consistent with empiricism and with his conception of personality at the same time, and that for the sake of the latter he was compelled to call in the *a priori* in spite of himself, is part of the dialectic of empiricism and personality which we are to observe.

Now, what does Locke mean by denying innate ideas? Does he mean to deny the coöperative activity of mind in cognition? I propose to show in the discussion that follows, *first,* that Locke's denial of innate ideas in no sense directly means, or indirectly involves the denial of the *a priori* in cognition; *second,* that Locke makes definite assumptions and hints, which if logically followed out, would have committed him to the fact and validity of *a priori* cognition; *third,* that nevertheless it must be confessed that Locke never reaches nor shows that he even understands the real question about *a priori* cognition at all, and thus cannot be said to answer it directly.

In the Lockean sense, an "innate idea" is an idea consciously possessed by all minds from birth, underivative from any experience and antedating all experience. The first chapter of the *Essay* is devoted to showing that there is no evidence for the existence of such ideas,—which is not a very arduous task if "idea" be taken in Locke's sense, and if to be in the mind necessarily means to be *consciously* known. In fact, so easy is it to disprove innate ideas within Locke's meaning that it has been an interesting question against whom in particular Locke was directing his assault. Perhaps it was Lord Herbert, mentioned in the second book of the *Essay* (I, i, §§ 15-19). It is more than likely that Locke had in mind continental philosophers in general and Descartes in particular, although Descartes held to no such theory of innateness as Locke combats. No doubt Locke's general motive was to put a stop to the spinning out of elaborate theories from presuppositions wholly unguaranteed by the unconsulted facts of experience,—a procedure which "eased the lazy from the pains of search"; which only encouraged dogmatic speculation and led the understanding to go beyond its "tether."

But to deny innate ideas in this sense does not necessarily involve the denial of the *a priori,* when we use *"a priori"* to signify the elements which the mind contributes of its own activity to make experience possible,—elements not, indeed, temporally, but logically "prior" to experience. These necessary and logical implicates in experience express an innateness of which we may or may not be "conscious," though they make consciousness possible. They, at least, are instances of principles which are "in the mind" in so deep a sense that they are of its eternal constitution: "known" to but few, and yet at the basis of all knowing; when known, found only among the last objects of matured cognition,—not among the first, not connate.

Thus, because of the mere fact of the denial of consciously innate "ideas," we must not accuse Locke of denying the *a priori*. That which is *implicitly* present in cognition—the *a priori*—is *ipso facto* ignored by any consideration devoted only to what is consciously present as the object of cognition.

It is easy to succumb to the temptation to go further and to say that Locke not only did not repudiate the self-active co-operation of the mind in cognition, but actually implied it and consciously recognized it; that, though this aspect of knowing is not duly emphasized by him, still it is presupposed and quietly revealed all through the *Essay*.

What are the evidences for such an interpretation of Locke? As one follows Locke's analysis of knowledge, he does become aware that Locke is not adhering consistently to his initial description of the mind as a blank sheet of paper, if we are to take the metaphor literally. The bare items of knowledge, however well accounted for, do not of themselves entirely explain the "knowledge." The merely passive "capacity" takes on character and proves to be a very definite kind of *activity*. Indeed, we find Locke directing our minds "to the consideration of God and spirits for the clearest idea of active power." For, says he significantly, though "active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural substances; and I mention them as such according to common apprehension;" yet they are not, perhaps, "so truly *active* powers as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them" (II, xxi, § 2). Locke speaks of thinking as what "in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of *operation* in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is *active*" (II, ix, §1). In this same passage he seems to imply that, after all, the mind is to be regarded as passive chiefly in the relative sense that "what it perceives, it *cannot avoid* perceiving;" but he states that even "in bare, naked perception" the mind is not entirely, but only "for the most part"

passive. Locke constantly speaks of the mind as the seat of *operations,* of which we become conscious in reflection. The mind may not have innate "ideas," but it has natural, and so innate "faculties," "fitted by nature to receive and judge" of that with which they are "duly employed" (I, iii, § 24). We find that the mind has the power of "elaborating" in myriad ways the ideas involuntarily received. The understanding can abstract and generalize ideas in ways different from their groupings and aggregations in the involuntary experience of sense;—indeed, it is in this way it often falls into error. In speaking of the ideas, Locke writes to Stillingfleet that he purposes to consider among other things "what *use the mind makes* of them in its several ways of thinking" (*Second Letter,* p. 72). Actual knowledge must be acquired; but *the power to know is innate.* Thomas Burnet, in his third letter in the form of a pamphlet criticising Locke, asks whether he "allows any powers to be innate to mankind." In the margin of this pamphlet found among Locke's papers, is found this note in his hand-writing: "I think noe body but this author who ever read my book could doubt that I spoke only of innate *ideas;* for my subject was the understanding, and not of innate *powers*" (See *"Marginalia Lockeana,"* by Noah Porter, in *New Englander and Yale Review,* July, 1887). An advocate of the "intellectualism" of Locke could well cite passages where we are told that sense-perception simultaneously reveals both ego and non-ego, and could assert with some show of reason that here is unconsciously hinted the coöperative power of mind, not absolutely alien to the Kantian view. Certainly Locke does admit self-evident principles, upon which all demonstration rests. He says in the *Third Letter to Stillingfleet*: "I contend for the usefulness and necessity of self-evident propositions in all certainty, whether of intuition, or of demonstration" (p. 286). Again he says, "I make self-evident propositions necessary to certainty, and found all knowl-

edge or certainty in them" (p. 340). Locke seems to forsake his mere temporal apriority for a logical apriority when he says further that whether these self-evident principles come into view of the mind sooner or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native evidences. Thus, while Locke denies innate ideas, he does seem to make room for some sort of intellectual necessity. "He would be thought void of common-sense, who, asked on the one side or on the other, went about to give a reason why it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. It carries its own light and evidence with it and needs no other proof" (I, ii, § 4). Such a principle, Locke implies, is independent of experiential proof, although it may not become evident save in the course of experience.

Other traces of a recognition of the activity of mind are found in the account of complex ideas as "inventions" of the understanding,—ideas formed by the soul through its *power of combination.* In the chapter, "Of Complex Ideas," Locke added in the fourth edition, "As the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, *so it exerts several acts of its own,* whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the others are framed" (II, xii, § 1). Locke's insistence that the units of knowledge are the relations between ideas and not the ideas themselves, might lead us to expect a conscious implication of the active power of comparing at least, especially when we find him speaking of "comparing" as an "operation of the mind about its ideas" (II, xi, § 4).

But to search out and present all the interesting indications of this side of Locke's thinking would mean the compiling of a volume or two. It has been noted that Locke more distinctly recognizes the intellectual elements in the last book of the Essay; and this is somewhat doubtfully explained by Dr. von Hertling as a result of the gradually modifying influence of the Cambridge thinkers (*John Locke und die Schule von Cambridge*: 1893).

It is sufficient to see now, what was forecast at the beginning, that Locke is not the radical empiricist he apparently sets out to be; that, under his treatment, the human understanding gradually becomes active in spite of him. The mind is not satisfied with merely beholding the puppets of its ideas come and go; it arises and bestows upon them life, and the complex of the living drama.

Now what shall we conclude? No one can deny that Locke pronounces a series of assumptions which have no validity apart from the validity of *a priori* cognition. This was predicted as one of the dialectical results of empiricism. For instance, in letters to Stillingfleet, as well as in his demonstration of God in the *Essay* (IV, x.), Locke assumes the universality and necessity of the causal principle. "Everything that has a beginning must have a cause, is a true principle of reason which we come to know by perceiving that the idea of beginning to be is necessarily connected with the idea of some *operation;* and the idea of operation with something *operating,* which we call a cause" (*First Letter to Stillingfleet,* p. 135). Again, Locke gives us absolutely necessary relations in pure mathematics and in abstract ethics: unconditional certainties which he thinks may most deeply be called "knowledge;" and speaks, in a reply to Lowde, of the eternal and immutable nature of right and wrong.

But although Locke in these and in scores of other vital statements silently assumes the fact and the validity of *a priori* cognition, he is not at all conscious of this assumption in its true import. He did not question his assumptions sufficiently to know their implications; and to say that while denying innate ideas he affirms, nevertheless, *a priori* elements in experience, is to urge Locke further than he ever went,—however willingly he would have gone, had he lived to be shown the way by the great Königsberger. While affirming the mind's "capacity," Locke never deeply asked just what this capacity meant. While asserting the mind's "activity," he never asked the question

which would have transfigured vague "activity" into an epistemological asset of critical worth. He tells us at the very threshold of his search that he will not trouble himself to examine wherein the essence of the mind consists. A score of paths might have led him from the path he trod to the center of knowledge; but he passed them by,—indeed he perceived them not. Perception itself challenged him to solve its riddle, but he was content to call it inexplicable, saying, "How it is that I perceive, I confess I understand not." Had he examined perception deeply, he might have found that there are no "simple" ideas. He should have searched the real meaning of his complex ideas; and then he might have seen that mere experience, at best, can give us only a *sum* of simple ideas, an aggregation, possibly a "compound," but never that new thing called a "complex." He ignores the *combinative* aspect of judgment. He should have guessed the significance of the helplessness of empiricism in the attempt to account consistently for the complex idea of "substance." *It* does not come *ab extra.* Space is a generalization? But how is generalization itself possible? "Immensity" implies the intellectual obligation to add without limit (II, xiii, § 4); how could such an *obligation* come through the gates of sense? Suppose a person who has not the notion of Infinity; he starts to find it; will he ever get it? What is it in the mind that makes it necessary for us to form the idea of "Power" wherever "change" is seen? (II, xxi, § 3). Granted that self-evident principles are not consciously innate, and that they are "discovered" and are at once self-evident: what is really involved in their self-evidence? What is their nature and origin? Locke makes much of language in the processes of knowledge. The universal becomes a trick of speech. Nominalism is an easy outcome of empiricism. But what about the mental operation that makes the trick of speech possible? Locke is everywhere

conscious that the knowledge of which he can really assure us is far from fulfilling the intellectual ideal: *whose* ideal? And whence came it?

Locke never answers these questions; indeed, he never deeply asks them. Yet they are questions which, if asked, find their adequate answer only in the affirmation of *a priori* knowledge. Or, on the other hand, one believing in the *a priori* would not have left these problems unanswered, or at any rate untransformed.

Thus, though Locke's approach is epistemological, he never comes in sight of the central problem of epistemology. To put him in the school of the apriorists is a logical anachronism; just as to account him too absolutely among the empiricists is to shut one's eyes. His only definite conception of "innateness" was so restricted and, in his view, so important to refute, that he ignored the deeper meaning of innateness contended for in many forms and with varying success from Plato to Kant and Hegel. So that Hegel could say, criticising Locke in his *History of Philosophy,* that the true significance of innate principles "is that they are *implicit,* that they are essential moments in the nature of thought, qualities of a germ which do not yet exist: only in relation to this last is there an element of truth in Locke's conclusions." Locke's view of mind is static, not dynamic. He is so interested in what the mind has that he ignores what it does. So he attacks innateness only in its crudest form. He neglects the deeper question partly because he is not well enough acquainted with philosophy's history, and partly because his overweening interest in the concrete of physical experience shuts him out from critical insight into experience as resolved into implicates. He is guilty of an overemphasis that blinds. He sees clearly that one must stop trying to know the world independent of any experience of it; this is so true that he comes near thinking that it is the whole truth. His is a reaction against apriorism run wild.

In this reaction, experience is seen to be so necessary for thought, that the thinking is forgotten.

Perhaps it is idle to ask what Locke would have said had he been confronted with Kant's doctrine of the *a priori*. He would surely have recognized the illumination of a new question, and would not have answered it hastily. He would not have found here all the difficulties and dangers he found lurking in the "innate ideas."

But as it is, we have no verdict from Locke on the question, one way or another. It has been justly said that Locke is a magnificent confusion of all philosophers; he is not greatly troubled with consistency, the "bugbear of little minds." It is to be regretted that so many commentators have insisted on taking sides in opposite interpretations. In Locke, we see the "implications" of several positions; but for a philosopher to imply a position is very different from consciously and consistently announcing it. Let us be content to say that in Locke we have implications of idealism; and, much more obviously, implications of empiricism. It is easiest to ignore him on his idealistic side; for his rather suppressed belief in an active self was held so uncritically and with such annulling modifications. The metaphysical reality Locke believes in does not play much of a part in the development of his system. He was in keeping with the age he helped to make. After the Renaissance, idealism, however much implied, was not greatly carried out. The "carrying out" was realistic.

Locke thus left the way open for the statement of various views utterly incompatible with freedom or moral responsibility,—incompatible in short with moral personality.

What are these views? The view most intimately involved in the failure to recognize the *a priori* is that which forms Locke's characteristic message,—namely, the limited character of human knowledge. In placing these limits, Locke's empiri-

cism is most plainly manifest; and here is revealed a partial, though only partial, insight into the logical results of avowedly empiristic premises. Man stands between omniscience on the one hand, and nescience on the other. The *Essay* seems to start with this presupposition of limits; the chief thing is to decide just what those limits are, and then to find the foundation of assent to those probabilities which are made to play so large a part in practical life. We shall find this assent based on a deep belief in the rationality of the universe. Locke holds that reality is ever reasonable, but that the human understanding is not big enough to grasp it utterly. God's knowledge indeed is infinite; but ours is finite.

For Locke is an ontological dualist. He shuns the solipsistic result he thinks he sees in certain continental thinkers; we must have an outer reality independent of the knower. Both substratic realities are in the last resort inscrutable. The self in which the qualities of mind inhere is, as we have seen, the forever *unknown* self. Matter in its essence is a mystery, despite knowable primary qualities. Substance, thus, is an incalculable factor which vitiates the supposition of any absolute science in the world of nature. Knowledge is limited to the deliverances present in sense, or remembered as once present. Depending always upon the incomplete, knowledge itself is forever incomplete. We have no absolutely predictive science. There is no "certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies" (IV, iii, § 25). "I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, *scientifical* will still be out of our reach" (IV, iii, § 26).

Locke's chapter, "Of the Extent of Human Knowledge," is full of this modest doubt regarding the necessary validity of induction,—a doubt which, in some of its phrasings, makes us think of Hume. Perhaps the following declaration toward the

close of the chapter is as characteristic and unequivocal as any: "We are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophic knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us; concerning their secondary qualities, powers and operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge; but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these we can go no further than particular experience informs us of matters of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, likely to produce. But as to a perfect science of natural bodies (not to mention spiritual beings), we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labor to seek after it" (IV, iii, § 29).

Of course, in all this, Locke is more consistent with his empiricism than many a modern who, while shunning idealism, still holds to induction as giving the highest conceivable certainty.

But the denial of the attainment of absolute necessity in the realm of natural law means the utter paralysis of all calculable action, and thus sounds the death of freedom. Experience loses all power of teaching. No one can be morally responsible for carrying out a purpose in a world, however rational, whose rationality he cannot fathom. Still more deeply, such a world, so far as it has a law, reveals the knower as subject to it and not the eternal and sovereign legislator of that law. And with Locke the hurt is incurable; it arises from man's nature as finite.

Locke himself did not consider the absence of a certain knowledge of nature a fatal defect. Absolute certainty is not

what we finite beings require. We are too proud; we soar too high. Practical certainty is enough; and that, insists Locke, is ours. We should not "peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration and demand certainty where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments" (Introduction, § 5). This kingdom of probability, as has been mentioned, Locke builds on faith in the rationality and morality of the universe,—a faith which is at the last faith in God. Even a miracle is irrational only to us. Most of our actions are in the light of these "presumptive" probabilities.

How faith in the rationality of the universe can be made a rational faith; whether, in the carrying out of our moral purposes we would not soon despair if our action were really based upon mere probabilities; and how probability itself is determined as such without the idea of perfect knowledge, Locke does not tell us. Had he considered these questions thoroughly, he might have seen that the candle he gives us not only does not shine "bright enough for all our purposes," but itself sputters out,—and with no eternal flame to lend it light. Our "concernments" are greater than Locke thought; either they are the concernments of persons requiring eternal knowledge, or all concernment vanishes.

In my introductory remarks I tried to make it plain that real ethical personality precludes all derivation of the self from merely efficient causation. For, as efficiently caused, persons are lost in the chain of necessity where moral responsibility is impossible. It was also anticipated that the only way of escape is with Kant, to regard the self as not conditioned by nature's law, but as giving to nature her law. The logical carrying out of this view, as was indicated, can assign to the self who creates causation by its categories no efficient origin in time. Locke was not at variance with the traditional Hebrew theology which teaches that souls were efficiently created by the fiat of God. He

expressly speaks of spirits as "*created* spirits" (II, xxi, § 2). Indeed, in so far as he adduces a proof of the mere fact of God, he bases it on the principle that what begins must be caused; and man began,—so he must be caused. "What was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must have been produced by something else" (IV, x, § 3). Locke was not blind to the fact that all this is inconsistent with human freedom. A most significant passage on the subject appears in a letter to Molyneux (Jan. 20, 1693) in which he says: "Though I cannot have a clearer conception of anything than that I am free,—yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God; though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the consideration of this question, resolving all into this short conclusion:—that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free; though I see not the way of it."

It is greatly to Locke's credit that he saw and frankly confessed the absolute inconsistency of freedom with creationism. No one since Locke's day has made the inconsistency disappear, save by calling upon a mystic omnipotence, just as Locke did,—and then the inconsistency is only concealed, not solved. Even if we overlook the logic of our creation by God's fiat, of what worth is our individual being, and how is our moral task possible, when our assurance of continuance after the death of the body is dependent not only upon His revelation, but upon His arbitrary will?

It is only carrying this Hebraism a little further when we are told that "Moral good and evil is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the lawmaker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the lawmaker,

is that we call reward and punishment" (II, xxviii, § 5). We almost think we are reading a line from the hymnology of Israel when we find Locke declaring: "We are His creatures—for nobody can take us out of His hands" (II, xxviii, § 8). It was not altogether unfitting that among the last words Locke heard were those read from the Psalms of David. But such a pious rigorism as Locke gives us destroys even its own law, because it ultimately demands the utter sacrifice of the subjects that make it possible. In such a view, the last trace of moral autonomy disappears; or more correctly, the conception of moral autonomy has not yet been born.

In view of these various positions inimical to any real moral freedom, and thus to any real ethical personality, we are not surprised to find Locke somewhat troubled when he comes to deal explicitly with freedom, in the long chapter, "Of Power," already cited. There, we have seen, Locke aimed to give us the freedom of alternatives. He failed by making the will determined at last by natural necessity, in the name of "uneasiness," or the desire for happiness. At best, his later modifications of view, when considered in the light of our investigations of his general epistemological position, do not give us a will self-determined by reason, but a will whose determination has reason as *one of its conditions.* Even Webb (in his *Intellectualism of Locke,* p. 148) makes Locke's liberty "glide down the slope of motives into the chasm of necessity." And Fraser notes near the end of the chapter "Of Power" that, "Naturalism, or the universal applicability of physical causation as an adequate account of the voluntary determinations of spiritual agents equally with events in the material world, notwithstanding his vacillations, is Locke's implied principle."

Sufficient has now been said to show that Locke's empiricism does not consistently guarantee us any satisfactory ethical personality. Further, it ought to appear that the inadequacies which have emerged are due to a failure to understand the real question about the *a priori* and thus either silently to assume such cognition, or to be lost in contradictions which loudly call for it. That Locke does not apprehend what it means to be rationally self-active I have attempted to show mainly by calling attention to his emphasis on the superficial meaning of innateness. Of course, as a necessary result, an "eternal" person is a conception he never reaches. Eternity is made a mode of duration, along with hours, days, years (II, xiv, § 1). Eternity is simply duration without bounds. Thus, "eternal" in the sense of supertemporal is not conceived as belonging even to the Perfect Person: who dwells in time, though it is infinite time; and in space, though it is infinite space.

Locke is so many-sided that he is full of surprises. Although it has not been difficult to show that in the main he has not only left ethical personality unguaranteed, but has not even conceived it deeply, it is only just to add that his jealousy for moral freedom often gives him flashes of the deeper metaphysical conditions of freedom. In a posthumous writing, we find him criticising Malebranche in a way to suggest the bearings of monism on freedom,—saying that to explain the perception of sensible things as perception of divine ideas, is to lose our own power and personality in God's; and with this our moral responsibility. "This is the hypothesis that clears doubts, but brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza; by resolving all, even the thoughts and wills of men, into an irresistible, fatal necessity" (*Remarks on Some of Mr. Norris's Books, Wherein He Asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God*). This passage also hints what Locke might have said to the system of Berkeley.

Yet this eternal, self-active and only sufficing sense of the person, which Locke ignored was needed to make possible even that sort of personality he does give us, and even what knowledge is conceived within our reach. For, of course, there can be no thinking at all, even within Lockean limits, without categories, which find their meaning in the ultimate unity of the rational self. Locke *affirms* and *denies;* he discerns differences and identities to make possible his sense of judgment as comparison of two different things. We have seen that he does not always avoid judgments involving the necessity of the causal nexus; his Substance is causality run mad. Above all, he cannot even make the bare statement, which is his primal one, that *all* our ideas are derived from sense, without involving something more than mere experience in the assertion. For we can at once turn upon Locke and ask him: How can you, *on your principles,* certainly make out this statement? *How can you get over the millions of ideas we have and make this universal judgment about ideas?*

But I have already dwelt on this aspect of Locke in a manner quite sufficient for my purpose. To say that Locke unwittingly invokes a deeper conception of the person, even to make his partial conception intelligible, is simply to state that no partial truth is true if it is merely partial. A personal identity, such as Locke gives us, calls upon memory; but memory itself presupposes an absolutely self-identical self. Then, with regard to the existence of other minds, Locke is content to say: "That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reason, from their words and actions to be satisfied" (IV, iii, § 27). But this common-sense unquestioning of the existence of other minds, each specifically itself, must find its rational vindication. Vitally interested in questions of social polity, Locke's empiricism never sees that which makes the social regard fundamentally possible and eternally imperative. Whether

empiricism can ever see this unaided can await the treatment of Berkeley and Hume.

Again, Locke's faith in the immortality of the self is vindicated on no empirical grounds. His empiricism nowhere saves the self from being a mere "event." Stillingfleet saw deeper when he urged Locke to prove immortality from the very nature of the soul,—a task from which Locke piously and reprovingly withdraws, to make room for God's omnipotence.

Even if Locke had clearly seen the bearings of his epistemology on ethics, it is doubtful that it would have troubled him greatly. It would have been interesting to see just what sort of ethics he would have formulated had he seriously set about it. Urged to address himself to the subject more thoroughly, he considered it long; but his was a busy life, and at last he was content with saying that the Gospel is enough. The same answer no doubt contented him in the face of any inadequacies or any contradictions of his position with reference to the great verities. Whether he could rationally justify it or not, Locke believed in a religion in the very center of whose doctrine is the message of the eternal worth of the spiritual self,—the self that is worth more than "the whole world"; which is free through the truth, and whose supreme duty is to recognize other selves as equally eternal and free; with the perfect God as the ideal of all, love toward whom illuminates that love which souls reciprocally bestow upon one another. For while Locke may not have looked upon Christianity in the light of all these involvings, he was more than a nominal Christian. He writes on the reasonableness of Christianity; early in life he entertains the ideal of restoring Christianity to its original simplicity; his dying words bespeak his "sincere communion with the whole Church of Christ, by whatever names Christ's followers call themselves."

So Locke believes in the meaning and worth of persons more deeply than the limits of his philosophy will admit. A

person is always greater than any of the reasonings by which he denies himself.

The negative results to which we have come in the study of personality as treated by Locke are inevitable outcomes of the nature of his method and the express character of his limited purpose. He is imbued from the first with the spirit of science rather than with the spirit of metaphysics. The beginning of his external career as an empirical enquirer in the study of medicine becomes typical of his subsequent mode of regard. Those whom he esteems "master-builders" in the "Epistle to the Reader,"—Boyle, Sydenham, Huygenius, and "the incomparable Mr. Newton," were all men with scientific rather than metaphysical interests. Locke aims to be an "under-laborer" in the same realm, "clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge." It would seem that a search into the final grounds of induction would have been an important task in this clearing of the ground, but Locke avoids the inquiry. He is not primarily interested in speculative questions; they may be all very well, most alluring mysteries, but Locke prefers the practical world of fact as of fundamental importance. Thus it is as he truthfully announces,—his is the "historical plain method." In that phrase is told the story of Locke's greatness, but of his inadequacy as well. The "historical plain method," taken by itself, is thoroughly helpless for discovering the real meaning of knowing, or for proving the reality of persons. The history of consciousness will never show how consciousness is possible. As Lord Shaftesbury well remarks: "What has birth or the progress of the fœtus to do in this case?" Description can never be complete and it merely presents what needs itself to be explained. So the origin of ideas is not logically explained by tracing their temporal rise in man's conscious life. No supertemporal self will ever be found in mere observation of the temporal. The logical is not explained by the chronological. Locke

observes the understanding as a fact among other facts in a world of time and space without asking what makes possible such facts. He likes the introspective method of Descartes; but he looks inward with the eye of sense, and not with logic's interpretative vision.

The result of all this is that we have no *critical analysis* of knowing. We are told *what* is, or what appears to be, but are not told *why* it is. Locke himself consciously circumscribes his aim when he says in the Introduction that it will suffice to his "present purpose to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are employed about the *objects* which they have to do with." Of course the historical plain method of observation does not, as such, take us beyond sensation and reflection. If the results of the method are taken as giving any answer regarding the nature of knowing, in that answer *the intelligible is inevitably reduced to the sensible.*

The fact is that Locke's presupposition about "substance" determines for him the limitations of his method. When the nature of spirit is inscrutable at the outset; when inquiry concerning its real character is dismissed as irrelevant,—the only "method" left us is, of course, the historical plain method. This view of unknowable substance at the basis of the material and spiritual worlds must be reconsidered before we can progress further toward a real knowledge of anything,—let alone a real knowledge of the knower.

Yet, even in Locke's restricted method we can see an important step toward the recognition of real personality. If this question is one which keen epistemological inquiry can best illumine, we must not withhold credit from one who is the first of moderns definitely to attack the question concerning what we can know,—even if he did not sufficiently ask the deeper question concerning *how* we can know. This latter question was not critically considered until Kant, who it should be remembered,

carefully read and admired his English predecessor, although he does not name him as often as he does Hume. Kant's admiration is most eloquently revealed in the fact that the form of his own great *Kritik* is modelled on that of the *Essay*.

CHAPTER IV

BERKELEY'S VIEW OF PERSONALITY

The logical approach to Berkeley is the approach through Locke, however much historians of philosophy have tended to separate the two men by all the difference of two contrasted schools. Such idealism as can be attributed to Berkeley is born of a criticism of the realism of his predecessor; a criticism made possible not so much by a principle of Berkeley's origination as by principles already enunciated by Locke. It is Hegel, with his ever-illuminating insight into the inner relations of historic systems, who rightly gives as the logical first sentence of his lecture on Berkeley: "This Idealism, in which all external reality disappears, has before it the standpoint of Locke, and it proceeds directly from him" (*History of Philosophy,* tr. by Haldane, Vol. III, p. 364).

This logical derivation of Berkeley from Locke is supported by the known fact that the *Essay* was the subject of Berkeley's serious study at Trinity College, Dublin. The *Essay* is obviously in mind throughout the pages of the *Common Place Book,* begun when Berkeley was a young man of twenty (1705). In the *Principles of Human Knowledge,* published five years later, the *Essay* is still the regnant inspiration, even when the argument looks toward the negation of some of Locke's fundamental views. And in *Siris,* the more constructive expression of Berkeley's mature thought, one is constantly reminded of the spirit that first set Berkeley to thinking.

However close may be the relationship between Locke and Berkeley, we find the fundamental message of the latter apparently very divergent from that of his predecessor,—a diverg-

ence of a character calculated to make us suppose that at last we have come to a thinker who will guarantee to us the ultimate reality of spirits. For whereas Locke told us there are two fundamental substantial realities, material on the one hand, and spiritual on the other, Berkeley announces that what is real must be resolved to spirits and their ideas. In order to see this proposition as Berkeley saw it, we must note how he was led to it by a consideration of Locke's views.

That which had troubled Locke most was his complex idea of Substance. Strictly adhering to his doctrine of the source of ideas, the idea of this mystic but indispensable "something I know not what" could not be justified. Yet to his spiritual and material "substrates" Locke felt he must hold as to unquestionably "real existences;" indeed, with Locke, Substance is, after all, what we mean by the ultimately real,—a reality that merely finite minds can never adequately fathom. To be true, Locke had said that we do have ideas which represent primary or real qualities in this mystic substrate, but by far the greater number of qualities perceived—the "secondary"—are to be regarded as subjective, although in some way dependent upon primary qualities.

This discussion about secondary as distinguished from primary qualities in the "real existence" of outer substance is a hint which Berkeley is not slow in following. What, after all, do we mean by "real existence?" What is it to be? In the *Common Place Book* we find a remark which is the key to Berkeley's initial search; he jots down: "Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality" (cf. *Principles*, § 89).

Locke had not discussed this question. Can there be any reality independent of perceiving mind? How can ideas be representative of that which is utterly independent and different from the ideas themselves? If ideas had such a representative

power (which is inconceivable), how could we *know* it? How could we compare ideas with the independent reality they represent in order to ascertain their truth?

In all this Berkeley is not denying the reality of what we call the material world; but he wants to know what that reality means. He concludes that there can be no primary qualities in the Lockean sense; that "nothing can be like a sensation or idea but a sensation or idea"; that so far as the outer world has "real existence," it consists in *being perceived by mind.* It is not a world in itself. If it has any reality apart from its perception by finite minds, it must be a reality derived from the mind of God. This fundamental conception of the reality of the outer world is forcibly presented toward the very beginning of the *Principles*: "Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known."

Of course this means the assumption of a mind or minds to do that perceiving which gives to all that is not mind the only reality it possesses. Ideas (and Berkeley includes sensations under "ideas") are passive and have no power of themselves to produce or to change ideas. "To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas" (*Principles,* § 25). "There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear." *"It must therefore be a substance;* but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance; it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active Substance or Spirit" (*Principles,* § 26).

Merely noting, for the time being, the interesting fact that here we have an argument apparently based on the necessity of the causal principle, we see that Berkeley lays it down as his general proposition that "human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads—that of ideas and that of Spirits" (*Principles,* § 86), and that he so far agrees with Locke as to conceive Spirit as Substance; though for Berkeley "there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives" (*Principles,* § 7).

In the third edition of the *Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,* Hylas makes the significant objection that the same reasons which obtained against the affirmation of material substance apply with regard to spiritual substance as well, since the ground for rejecting the former is that we can have no idea of it; and Philonous has admitted that "spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas" (Vol. I, p. 449). To this Philonous answers that he does not deny material substance merely because he has no idea of it, but because the very "definition" of material substance involves an inconsistency or "repugnance," which does not inhere in the supposition of spirit. "That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. But it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them."

Aside from the negative fact that the supposition of spiritual substance is not open to the charge of inconsistency, Berkeley further asserts its reality partly on the ground of intuitive certainty ("I know what is meant by the terms *I* and *myself;* and I know this immediately or intuitively", Vol. I, p. 447), and partly on inference from the fact of ideas and their changes, as shown above (*Principles,* § 26).

We have already noted that Locke did not appreciate the meaning of the *"Cogito ergo sum"* of Descartes. Nor does Berkeley consciously adopt it, also showing a misapprehension

of its real import when he sets down in his *Common Place Book,* "'*Cogito ergo sum.*' Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto" (Vol. I, p. 44),—a sentence written in the shadows of Trinity College, where Descartes was an acknowledged authority. Suppose it is a "tautology?" Was Berkeley bothered by Descartes' *"ergo,"* supposing an *inference* to be intended? In reality, Berkeley is getting very near the best there is in the *"Cogito"* when he says, no doubt with Descartes in mind, "Whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task" (*Principles,* § 98).

We recall that Locke had held that spiritual substance (as material substance) is inscrutable; that, indeed, the human understanding cannot even ascertain whether the soul is spiritual or material, since God might bestow the power of thinking upon matter; that, after all, the question is not of vital importance to our concerns. It is here that Berkeley differs profoundly. To Berkeley, it does make all the difference in the world whether soul-substance is matter or spirit; and, having shown the irresolvable inconsistency in supposing a matter-substance, he did away with the open doubt that Locke had left, in his deference to the omnipotence of God. On the very title-page of the *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,* Berkeley states as part of his design, "plainly to demonstrate . . . the Incorporeal Nature of the Soul."

This much we know then: that spirit exists and that it cannot be lost in any material substrate. Can we know aught further of this substance? Here we must pause to observe a distinction Berkeley makes between having an "idea" and having a "notion" of spirit, the latter alone being regarded possible. We cannot have any *idea* of spirit, for "that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea, or like an idea, is evidently absurd" (*Principles,* § 135).

In Berkeley's argument to show why we cannot be said to have an "idea" of spirit, there emerges what spirit essentially is. Indeed the known nature of spirit as such is always given as the very reason why we can have no idea of it. An idea is *inactive* and since its very existence consists in being perceived, it is *dependent*. But spirits are *active* and subsist by themselves (*Principles*, § 137). The *esse* of ideas is *percipi*: the *esse* of spirits is *percipere*. How can an idea, which can neither *will*, nor *think*, nor *perceive* be like a spirit, which does? "And there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills and perceives; this and this alone constitutes the signification of that term" (*Principles*, § 138).

Thus Berkeley holds that the term "spirit" signifies a real thing, though it is not an "idea." He is somewhat at loss what to call it. He sees that the word "spirit" has for him a definite meaning, and suggests that "in a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an 'idea' of spirit." In the first edition of the *Principles* the term "notion" was used interchangeably with "idea," but in the second edition Berkeley adds a paragraph in which he proposes to call spirit a "notion" and to confine the use of this term to spirit and to all relations, of which we can have no "idea." "I have some knowledge or *notion* of my mind and its acts about ideas; inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words" (*Principles*, § 142).

A spirit then is thinking, willing, perceiving, substance. "A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being—as it perceives ideas it is called the *understanding*, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the *will*" (*Principles*, § 27). Again, "I must include understanding and will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active" (*Common Place Book*). In this we are reminded of Locke in so far as he mentioned thinking and willing as the qualities peculiar to mind.

In all these passages note that *activity* is the very essence of spirits with Berkeley,—that which differentiates them from their ideas. I have remarked that Locke obscurely presages the Berkeleyan view when he makes secondary qualities of matter subjective. He still more strongly prophesies Berkeley when he speaks, as he often does, of spiritual substances as the only active powers in the universe, matter being regarded as wholly passive (*Essay,* II, xxi, § 2).

It should be observed that in a passage above quoted from the *Principles,* Berkeley speaks of a spirit as a "simple and undivided" being. In the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley explains that he calls the soul indivisible "because unextended; and unextended, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea" (Vol. I, p. 448).

If we are to infer from this that "mobility" is not to be ascribed to the soul, we find a divergence from Locke, who added to thinking and willing, as qualities peculiar to spirit, duration and mobility, which were regarded by him as common to both spirit and matter. Duration, however, Berkeley seems to apply to finite minds; for apart from what is revealed by his view of the creation of finite spirits by God, and his notion of immortality as merely everlasting continuance, we find him speaking explicitly of the "duration" of finite spirits, which "must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in the same spirit or mind" (*Principles,* § 98).

It will be remembered in this connection that Locke made even God a spaced and timed being,—only, God was conceived as occupying infinite time and infinite space. He is everywhere, so that, on this account Locke said, there is no doubt of God's identity. In a letter to the Reverend Samuel Johnson, Berkeley is careful to explain not only that God is unextended; but he goes on to say that "By the ' τὸ νῦν ' I suppose to be im-

plied that all things, past and to come, are actually present to the mind of God, and that there is in Him no change, variation, or succession. A succession of ideas I take to constitute Time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think" (Vol. II, p. 19). In *Siris,* God is spoken of as a Spirit "distinct or separate from all sensible and corporeal beings" (Vol. III, p. 280).

On the immortality of the soul Berkeley has considerable to say. A sermon written when he was twenty-three, on *The Revelation of Immortality* seeks to vindicate the life and immortality brought to light in the Gospel. The subject turns up in various places in the *Principles* and in *Alciphron.* One of the articles in the *Guardian* is on "Natural Grounds to expect a Future State," and this title hints what it was Berkeley's real interest to show, that the soul is, *in its very nature,* immortal,—an interest Locke did not have, for which he was criticized by Stillingfleet who felt that in admitting that the soul may be immaterial, all natural proofs of immortality were made impossible.

In the *Principles* Berkeley submits that the natural immortality of the soul is the direct consequence of its nature as indivisible, incorporeal, and unextended, all of which involves its incorruptibility. For "nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies—cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, the soul of man is naturally immortal" (*Principles,* § 142).

Because man is *naturally* immortal is no reason in Berkeley's mind for saying that he is *necessarily* immortal; for though the ordinary laws of nature cannot dissolve the soul, this is not to say that "the Creator who first gave it being" cannot annihilate it if he choose (*Ibid.*).

Already we have come in sight of doctrines which have an obvious bearing on the question of moral freedom. Reserving until later our final decision as to whether Berkeley guarantees any real freedom, as well as the presentation of the contradictions inherent in the explicit statement of his view, it is well first to present just what that view is.

While the nature of the will is discussed in various places in the *Principles,* freedom is the special theme of several sections in the middle of the seventh dialogue in *Alciphron,* the work of Berkeley's middle life. Euphranor, who represents Berkeley's view, contends for human liberty as against the determinism which Alciphron urges as making impossible religion and morality. It is in examining the answers given by Euphranor to Alciphron's objections that Berkeley's view of freedom will best assert itself.

Alciphron first objects that human liberty, which alone can vindicate moral responsibility, is impossible because volition is merely the mechanical effect of the striking of corporeal objects upon the organs of sense,—"communicated to the soul or animal spirit in the brain," in which is produced a determination which *necessarily* results in action. "This being the case, it follows that those things which vulgarly pass for human actions are to be esteemed mechancial, and that they are falsely ascribed to a free principle" (*Alciphron,* § 16). We think we are free, but in reality we are puppets, whose threads or wires are invisible.

Euphranor willingly admits that this argument is pertinent enough in the case of one who concedes that the soul is corporeal; but the soul is incorporeal, and so one cannot speak of it as being "moved." Much less then can he identify its volition with mechanical motion. "Motion and thought are two things as manifestly distinct as a triangle and a sound" (*Alc.,* § 16).

Alciphron now takes up a different line of argument. He strives to prove his point despite the supposition that the soul

is incorporeal. The will is not free, for it is determined as the necessary result of a process of which everybody is conscious when he wills. This process is as follows: "An object offers itself to the mind. First the *understanding* considers it; in the next place the *judgment* decrees about it, as a thing to be chosen or rejected, to be omitted or done in this or that manner; and this decree of the judgment *doth necessarily determine the will,* whose office is merely to execute what is ordained by another faculty; consequently there is no such thing as freedom of the will" (*Alc.,* § 17). A perfectly free will, Alciphron argues, is a will that is controlled by nothing but itself: but the will is governed by judgment and so is under a necessity imposed by something foreign to itself. In fact, man has no faculty in which the principle of freedom obtains; for every faculty is determined in all its acts by something foreign to it. The understanding is compelled to see its idea as it presents itself; the appetites are the subjects of natural necessity; even reason has its limits, for it "cannot infer indifferently anything from anything, but is limited by the nature and connexion of things, and the eternal rules of reasoning" (*Alc.,* § 17).

It will be seen that Alciphron is conceiving of the will as a separate and independent "faculty," a mere "power," separated from reason, and whose true freedom, thus, is conceived as the freedom of utter indifference, or better, of caprice.

As a final argument, Alciphron mentions the prescience of God as meaning predetermination, since what is foreknown will certainly be, and what is certain is necessary.

Euphranor replies to this last point by merely stating that "certain" and "necessary" seem to him very different; the first does not involve the second in the sense of constraint; and while an action may be foreseen, it may also be foreseen *as the effect of choice.*

As to Alciphron's main argument, it is objected that all the perplexities raised are consequent upon *abstracting* and distinguishing the actions of the mind, judgment and will. Euphranor says that he himself cannot abstract the decree of judgment from the command of the will; but the terms used in the whole argument, such as power, faculty, act, determination, freedom, necessity and the like, are used "as if they stood for distinct abstract ideas." Of course if we adopt the doctrine of abstract ideas we shall be able to raise a dust. But apart from such subtle distinctions, "it is evident to us in the gross and concrete" that we are free agents. In spite of all argument, I am indubitably conscious that I am "an active being who can and do determine myself." The plain man will confirm this. It is folly to puzzle ourselves with an attempt at a notion of freedom in the abstract.

Furthermore, if we are free, we are plainly *accountable.* If you challenge this, "I shall make bold to depart from your metaphysical *Abstracted* Sense and appeal to the *Common* Sense of mankind" (*Alc.,* § 18). Everyone knows that he acts and that what he acts he is accountable for. It isn't necessary to go into such subtle questions as "What determines the will?" It is enough to say that man, "acting according to his will, is to be accounted free." To go behind this and ask whether a man can will as he wills is absurd. According to received natural notions "it is not doubted that man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-determined" (*Alc.,* § 19).

Looking at this defense of freedom as a whole, we see that the arguments for determinism are regarded as proceeding upon either of two false suppositions,—the corporeal nature of the soul, or the legitimacy of abstract ideas. The fact is, says Euphranor, as a fitting period to his defense, "the only original true notions that we have of *freedom, agent,* or *action,* are obtained by reflecting on ourselves and the operations of our own minds" (*Alc.,* § 20).

Berkeley's expressed views on freedom have been presented in such detail because the question has such vital bearings upon our general theme, and because there will be occasion to compare Berkeley's explicit view on this subject with the implications of his empiric epistemology, as well as of his ontology, so far as he has one.

We observe that the desire for the vindication of moral accountability which appears in Locke's *Essay* is a characterizing element of Berkeley's thought. We have seen how Locke, in order to give us a "person" whose accountability would not be perilously dependent upon any theories of substance, developed a theory of personal identity as constituted by the appropriation of past acts to present consciousness. In this way, he thought, we would have an accountable person whether the soul be material or spiritual substance.

But Berkeley, who has settled once for all that soul-substance is incorporeal, does not find it necessary to separate identity of substance from identity of person. It is no longer merely probable that in consciousness the spiritual substance is manifesting itself to itself. With Berkeley, persons are the *only* substances. Besides, Berkeley regards Locke's view that personality is constituted by consciousness open to many objections. Berkeley demands wherein the identity of a person consists and answers: "Not in *actual* consciousness; for then I am not the same person I was this day twelve-month, but only while I think of what I then did. Not in *potential*; for then all persons may be the same for aught we know" (*Com. Pl. Bk.*).

Thus far I have endeavored to present Berkeley's explicit account of spirits as regards their bare existence and their nature as thinking and willing, as free and as immortal. In this exposition, however, the existence of other minds has been taken for granted. Passages regarding the existence of other finite minds are to be found here and there in Berkeley's writings,

from the *Principles* to *Siris*. The import of all these passages is substantially the same. While I have an immediate knowledge of my own mind, my knowledge of other spirits is mediate, depending upon the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, "as effects or concomitant signs" (*Principles,* § 145).

Passing from the consideration of finite minds to that of the Infinite Mind, or God, we pass to what Berkeley all along regards as the ultimate support and triumph of his "system." Were one developing an exposition of Berkeley's philosophy as such, instead of merely presenting his expressed views regarding personality, one should introduce the Infinite Mind near the very beginning. The postponement of this central theme to this place is not disadvantageous, since it is so intimately linked with our succeeding task, the finding of the logical bearings on personality of Berkeley's total position.

The being of sensible things, of ideas, is in their being perceived by mind. But their reality does not for that reason depend upon their being perceived by *my* individual mind. In fact I find that while I may control my individual fancies, the ideas of sense are not dependent upon my individual will. They come without my volition. They are more strong, lively and distinct than the ideas of my imagination. And, above all, the ideas of sense appear in a certain regular order or connexion which does not obtain in thoughts that are my own creation. But this is the experience of *any and all* individual, finite minds. The inevitable inference from this independence of individual minds which ideas of sense have, is that their ultimate being, together with their order is to be attributed to the mind of an infinite spirit, or God. So, Philonous is made to say in one of the most comprehensive passages in the *Dialogues*: "When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean *my* mind in particular, but *all* minds. Now it is plain they have

an existence exterior to *my* mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it." Philonous concludes that "there is, therefore, some other Mind wherein they exist during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them; as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent eternal Mind which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the laws of nature" (Vol. I, pp. 446-7).

Thus, in Berkeley's view a certain externality is not denied sensible things with reference to each individual mind, although nothing is external to all mind. Ideas are external in two senses: first, their origin is external, since the individual finite mind does not create them though it perceives them; and, second, their existence is in another Mind when any particular mind perceives them not (*Principles,* § 90). Berkeley is careful to state that the real question between himself and the materialists is not whether things have a real existence out of particular minds, but whether they have a real existence independent of all mind whatsoever (Vol. I, p. 452).

So God is the ultimate explanation of the being of sensible phenomena, as well as the meaning of the cosmical order and law that appears in all the change of experience. Since ideas of sense are at last referred to the one Mind, we have a clue as to why they appear practically the same to different minds. And the order in nature, sustained by the mind of God is what makes possible any predictive science, by which our lives may be made calculable. Not that there is any *causal* connexion between ideas; that is impossible, for there is nothing of power or agency included in mere ideas; "so that one object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another" (*Principles,*

§ 25). The very being of an idea implies passiveness,—the being perceived.

Nor is there discoverable any *necessary* connexion between ideas. No,—all order, all succession, all natural law is the issue of the Will of the Governing Spirit (*Principles,* § 32).

Instead of relations of cause and effect, we have relations of sign and thing signified (*Theory of Vision,* § 13). To be true, there is a cause which makes the connexion of ideas possible, but God is this cause, and not the ideas. This significative character of the connection between ideas was clearly enunciated in Berkeley's early work just cited, the *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), where the proper objects of vision are made to constitute the universal language of nature; for "the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human appointment; which do not suggest the things signified by any *likeness* or *identity* of nature, but only by an habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between them" (§ 147).

We have, thus, a universal sense-symbolism, a divine language. Communion with nature is communion with God. So that God is even more evidently perceived than the existence of other finite spirits; for "whereas one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind," tokens of divinity are manifested at all times and in all places. Everything perceived by sense, including "*those very motions produced by men,*" we are bound to infer as the effect of the Eternal Spirit, the Creator and the conservator of the world; "in whom," as Berkeley is fond of quoting, "we live and move and have our being" (cf. Title-page, *Theory of Vision*).

CHAPTER V

CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF BERKELEY'S VIEW

Berkeley's interest, no less than Locke's, is fundamentally epistemological. Though he puts his initial question in the form, "What is it to be?" his decision of this question is suggested and gathers point as an answer to the question about the nature of mind as a *perceiving and knowing mind.* "How can ideas be representative?" is Berkeley's query.

In the fundamental position at which Berkeley has been seen to arrive,—that all reality save minds is derived from being perceived by mind, we seem to have the implications of an apriorism which will release us from the difficulties Locke's empiricism met with in seeking to found ethical personality. As Locke's characteristic position seemed at first utterly to nullify the *a priori,* so, on the other hand, Berkeley's premises, at first sight, seem to affirm it. Spirits are primal, and the essence of spirits is their activity. The most thorough-going apriorist would agree with Berkeley so far as he holds that nature cannot be explained without the world of spirits, including God.

Especially in the *Siris,* Berkeley is enthusiastic in acclaiming active intelligence as the only explanation of the universe. And, read in their isolation, many passages might be taken to hint an apriorism almost of a Kantian sort. Here it is disclaimed that the mind is a *tabula rasa;* and it is suggested that "Some, perhaps, may think the truth to be this: that there are properly no ideas, or passive objects in the mind but what were derived from sense; but that *there are also besides these her own acts or operations;* such are notions" (*Siris,* § 308). Even in the *Principles,* "all relations, including an *act of the mind*" are regarded as notions (§ 142).

In the seventh dialogue of *Alciphron,* we are told that Reason is under "the eternal rules of reasoning." The prescribing necessity of reason is implied when Philonous says: "I know nothing inconsistent can exist"; and he concludes that matter cannot exist, since it implies an inconsistency (Vol. I, p. 451). And, as has been seen, so far as Berkeley makes the existence of mind a necessary inference from the fact of the existence and succession of ideas, he is implying the principle of causality in a way that cannot be allowed a mere empiricist. Add to this Berkeley's belief in the possibility of predictive science.

However much these and other of Berkeley's assumptions may imply *a priori* cognition if they are to be made valid, it is not hard to show that Berkeley is really an empiricist. In common with Locke he denies innate ideas and believes that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. In the *Common Place Book* we find Berkeley saying: "I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, *'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.'* I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas" (Vol. I, p. 48). The mind is originally empty and God gives it its ideas. Reflection is always "maturer" than sensation; by this we separate out the *meaning* in sensation. Berkeley does not ask how a secondary sense can get anything *out* of sensation that is not *in* sensation itself. In order to get a meaning *out of* experience, we must show that the meaning is really *there.* Empiricism does not see that only reflection can afford the meaning.

In so far as Berkeley holds that the universe is to be referred to mind, it is in the last resort to be referred to the Infinite Mind. Whatever "acts" or "operations" of minds are recognized, they are not constitutive save in the case of God; and then only in the questionable sense of the productive activity of his arbitrary will.

This of course is not *a priori* cognition nor rational freedom in any defensible sense. Finite minds are not made rationally self-active; in no sense are they recognized as originative of the unity and permanence of the world of experience,—contributive of the necessary ties that make experience possible. Berkeley sees order. Its ground, he assumes, is God,—a pure assumption, a mystic solvent; but once assumed, fatally annulling of any *a priori* theory of knowing.

Kant, "critical" idealist that he is, "will object to Berkeley as a "dogmatic" idealist (Kant calls him "visionary" as well) in two principal ways. In the first place, "the good Bishop Berkeley" degrades bodies to mere illusion, for he goes so far as to give us no external world. He can give us no difference between a sensation and an image, save a difference in vivacity. For space is reduced to a "sense of locomotion" (muscular sense, sense of effort) between vision and touch; that is, external sense is confounded with and reduced to internal sense. The reality of the world is not denied; but its externality is lost. Berkeley's great interest was to show that Absolute Space, such as he mentions was argued for by Sir Isaac Newton, is unreal (*Siris*, § 271). Says Kant: "Berkeley declares Space and all things to which it belongs as an inseparable condition, as something impossible in itself, and therefore the things in Space as mere imaginations. Dogmatic Idealism is inevitable if we look upon Space as a property belonging to things by themselves, for in that case Space and all of which it is a condition would be a non-entity" (*Critique of Pure Reason,* tr. Müller, Vol. I, p. 475). Kant, in treating Space and Time as the two *a priori* forms of sense-perception, and distinguishing Time, as the form of internal sense, from Space, which (together with Time) is the form of external sense, sought to give us a really external world, and yet an external world that need not destroy idealism.

In the second place, instead of grounding the order of the world in an Omnipresent Intelligence, Kant most consistently interpreted, finds it in the spontaneous unity of the perceiving self. In this vital regard at least, and ignoring Kant's own unsatisfactory account of God, an idealism that shall be genuinely idealistic and genuinely personalistic as well, must part company with Berkeley and affiliate with Kant.

Again, as in the case of Locke, the failure to answer in the affirmative the real epistemological question as to the *a priori* involves Berkeley in the failure to guarantee human personality in the ultimately real sense of a personality that can rightly be called rationally self-active,—eternal, as the source of Time, and thus eternal in the real sense of super-temporal,—underived, free. Again, as with Locke, Berkeley fails not only to affirm *a priori* cognition, but obviously fails to face the question at all; while maintaining that all reality is derived from mind, he does not critically ask how this is possible. And so, like Locke, he cannot be said to answer one way or another a question he has never recognized. And again, as Locke, having never duly appreciated the question which is at the heart of epistemology, he not only fails to vindicate personality, but does not even conceive what personality in its deepest sense must mean. For instance, we have seen that immortality is taken in the sense of everlasting duration. No attempt is made to argue this on empiristic grounds. The discussion on freedom, too, does not go back of the empirical fact that we do will. And the self-activity alleged of spirits is not, in the last resort, *self*-activity at all.

Yet, to guarantee the person, even in Berkeley's inadequate sense, means the adducing of proof founded on the assumption of that deeper personality which he omits. Even Berkeley's "immortality" of never-ending continuance, the lifting of the soul above the event called death, means the proof of a soul which is above all mere "events" and which is the source of Time which

makes a world of events possible. But though Berkeley does not perceive this, he does see that without immortality any moral ideal becomes a mockery, its realization impossible,—yea, morals in any deep and proper sense vanishes. In a short essay in the *Guardian* Berkeley realizes that "The thought that our existence terminates with this life doth naturally check the soul in any generous pursuit, contract the views, and fix them on temporary and selfish ends. It dethrones the reason, extinguishes all noble and heroic sentiments, and subjects the mind to the slavery of every present passion" (Vol. IV, p. 162). In another essay he exclaims: "If it were not for this thought (of immortality), I had rather be an oyster than a man, the most stupid and senseless of animals than a reasonable mind tortured with an extreme innate desire of that perfection which it despairs to obtain" (Vol. II, p. 184). And yet, Berkeley, though striving to prove for us a "natural" immortality, so failed that he had to grant at last that our annihilation is in the power of God!

Again, "free agents," even in Berkeley's limited and questionable meaning are impossible without free persons in a deeper sense of freedom. It will be remembered that Alciphron conceived of no freedom save freedom of the will isolated from reason, and so, undetermined by reason—a freedom of indifference, of caprice. It is to the credit of Berkeley that he makes Euphranor object to this conception of an "abstract" will, although he does so by an appeal to common sense. But he does not proceed to urge a rational self-determination. To be true, he does use the word "self-determined", but in the loose sense that we are conscious that we do act and that we are accountable for our actions, in spite of Alciphron's "abstractions." Berkeley misses the true question about freedom when he makes Euphranor repudiate as irrelevant the question "whether a man be free to will." After all, the whole question with regard to a man's freedom is "whether he can will as he wills", although this very

question is dismissed by Euphranor as unintelligible. The outward action attributed to me does not determine the philosophical question as to whether *I* act, and does not prove freedom at all. Alciphron could not reconcile an utter "freedom" of the will with its determination by reason. Berkeley was not in a position to make the only reconciliation possible,—the reconciliation which finds itself in a freedom which proceeds from a definiteness which is not determinism in any fatal sense, but only in the saving sense of a definiteness self-originative in the reason of the agent. This would have made possible an answer to Alciphron's objection that reason itself is not free because it is limited by "the eternal rules of reasoning." But of course for Berkeley to have seen all this would have meant a transfiguration of his entire philosophy.

Apart from its philosophic inconceivability, Berkeley opposes Locke's realism because he sees in it scepticism which he believe is the death of religion and morality. Thus, he sees that the question of moral responsibility is vitally connected with the question of whether we can know. Ostensibly, Berkeley is the champion of the reality of human knowledge. On the title-page of the *Principles* he announces that one aim of his inquiry is to discover "the grounds of scepticism"; and the title-page of *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* states that part of his design is "plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge . . . in opposition to sceptics . . . also to open a method for rendering the sciences more easy, useful, and compendious."

But on his principles, can Berkeley make out any *science* at all,—any necessary and predictive knowledge, indispensable to calculable, that is to say rational, action; indispensable to freedom in short? Has he any principle by which he can gain any valid inferential certainty? To be sure, the order, the regular succession which obtains among ideas of sense, is empirically recog-

nized. The very name of his mature work, *Siris* (σειρά), suggests this order as a universal "chain" with no broken links in all the vast concatenation. But, as we have seen, this order is referred to the mind of God. So far as finite minds are concerned, Berkeley gives us only the resources of empiricism as a foundation for prediction,—which is no foundation at all. For, as empiricist, Berkeley can only tell, at best, what has been. Mere "faith" that there is a divine order, even if it were justified, does not tell us what that divine order infallibly must be. Habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe between ideas does not show us how experience can teach, or that habitual connexion is *more* than habitual. In *Siris,* more than in his earlier works, Berkeley seems to rest on a "faith" and "probability" which made Locke give man's knowing powers an intermediate place between omniscience and nescience. The universe is too great for our finite understandings, which interpret sense-symbolism imperfectly. Thus, we are left in the questionable realm of probable certainty,—where, to be left is to be left nowhere, if we are good logicians and seek a meaning in our judgments.

In attempting to dissolve scepticism and dogmatism by resolving matter to spirit and its activity, Berkeley has proved an infallible knowledge for spirits only if he has proved them in some sense rationally self-active. This he has not done. Yet, this deeper person is assumed in all Berkeley's inferences; in all the power Berkeley as a nominalist gives to language as the money of thought; in all the capacity to *acquire* ideas,—which presupposes elements whose logical meaning is not found merely in their psychological genesis; yes, in perception itself. As an empiricist, Berkeley cannot make out "substance", spiritual or other, for "substance" finds its home in the world of the unconditionally real,—and the paths of experience as such lead not thither. Much less can the inference to other finite spirits be made.

If all this is true, even the Infinite Mind, without whom Berkeley's idealism falls to pieces, becomes a pure assumption, being based on "empirical inference". An infinite conclusion cannot be drawn from finite premises. God is not proved; what is proved is that Berkeley's system will not "work" without God. If there were not an omnipresent consciousness, matter would "slump." It is the office of God in Berkeley's system to "bear away its inconsistencies," as Hegel phrased it. But is any "system," logically defenseless, yet so important that God may be called in to save it? This is doing too much violence to logic,—let alone God.

But even if Berkeley had proved the kind of God he wished to prove, it would not have greatly helped the situation, so far as the guarantee of real personality is concerned. For assuming his God valid, He is valid only as all reality ultimately proceeds from Him. The activity of other spirits, no less than the ideas they perceive, are at the last derivatives of the activity of the Eternal Mind. To my mind, any such theological idealism may as well be called pantheistic idealism. God is not a link in the chain (σειρά); He *is* the chain. "All things necessarily depend on Him as their Conservator as well as Creator;—all nature would shrink to nothing if not upheld and preserved in being by the same force that first created it" (*Letter to Rev. S. Johnson,* Vol. II, p. 16). God is He who "works in all" and "by whom all things consist." Spirit is the only cause: but that turns out to mean that the Eternal Spirit is the only cause. Thus, a finite persons is not "*causa sui.*" He is a receptacle of God's activity. His experience is intercourse with the Absolute. "In Him we live and move and have our being" with a vengeance. Really *to be* is *to be God.* He who made us can annihilate us when he pleases.

In this we observe the indirect influence of Hebraism on Berkeley's thought. As in Locke so in Berkeley, we hear the

echoes of the thunders of Sinai when Berkeley enunciates that conformity to God's will and not any prospect of temporal advantage is the sole rule whereby every man must govern and square his actions. We may take for granted that what He proposes is good. Absolute unlimited passive obedience is due to the Supreme Power (*Discourse on Passive Obedience,* §§ 6, 7, 32). Autonomy is out of the question. With the destruction of the ultimate reality of finite spirits is destroyed their ultimate moral responsibility,—that is to say, all *real* moral responsibility. Locke saw more deeply than Berkeley when he perceived an inconsistency, however mysteriously to be overcome, in affirming God as the omnipotent Creator and in affirming human freedom at the same time. Berkeley on the other hand, can see no contradiction in supposing that God can create free beings (*Alciphron,* p. 350). Hylas is nearer right than Philonous when he declares that "in making God the immediate author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins." When Philonous comes to God's rescue, he is guilty of a woful misapprehension concerning what "consistency" in this case means when he says: "It is true I have denied there are other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking, rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of our own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions (Vol. I, p. 454).

A careful scrutiny of Berkeley's central proposition, that reality is to be interpreted as the existence of spirits and their ideas, has not justified the hope with which we started. The spirits have been lost in Spirit; either in "God," (as pantheistic or as creative), if we choose to assume him, or in the solipsistic self, if we decline to share Berkeley's leap across the chasm of the infinite. Yet, it is a great advance upon Locke, in

all that concerns our question, to have done away with the mystical material substratum,—a stroke of genius, John Stuart Mill regarded it. In this regard, Berkeley showed his genius in knowing how to ask the right question,—which he considered the very essence of philosophizing. In his answer, his triumph is that in spite of his empiricism he does take us the idealistic way, although our guide is "dogmatic", "visionary", and loses us for the time in the horizonless desert of pantheism. His great defect is that he does not see that his leading the idealistic way is indeed in spite of his empiricism. Yet, notwithstanding great defects of exposition and system, the significance of his procedure cannot be denied, in so far as he directs our attention to *thinking mind,* and suggests the criticism which he does not supply. Even here we have an advance over Locke; for Berkeley's is a mind to which questions of speculative import are more congenial and more acutely apprehended; a mind much better acquainted with the history of philosophy, as *Siris* well attests; a mind not so cautious of forsaking the common road, if it be necessary to forsake it to "follow the gleam."

Thus, as was forecast, the inner contradictions and insufficiency of empiricism for guaranteeing personality becomes still more apparent in Berkeley. The spirit which expresses itself in the aversion for empty abstractions and in an appeal to the concrete data of experience, is the spirit that keeps him well in the historic succession with Locke, and prevents his profounder criticism of fundamental premises.

What befalls even the persons Berkeley gives us, when empiricism attempts a stricter criticism of itself, will be found in an examination of Hume, where the dialectic, which has been struggling to express itself, will enunciate its utter word.

CHAPTER VI

HUME AND THE SELF-DEFEAT OF THE PERSON

In discussing the treatment of personality by Locke and Berkeley, we have been dealing with philosophers who do assume, with more or less explicitness, the reality of persons. Persons being supposed in some sense or other, we could approach these thinkers and demand further what sort of personality each recognized, and challenge the worth of the conception and its proofs. But with Hume, the overt assumption of a perduring ego vanishes. No longer is there given us the genial task of gathering together an author's total view of personality; for Hume will not seek to vindicate any; and our function of criticism, such as was based on former expositions is simultaneously overthrown by a thinker who has instituted a self-criticism so acute that we can only supplement him by asking what his criticism really means, and whether it has been carried as far as logic would have us go.

The center and import of Hume's work has often been termed a critique of causality, but it might also be called a critique of personality, within empiristic bounds. From this point of view, Hume is, after all, the best criticism of the doctrine of the person as held by Locke and Berkeley. Indeed, much of our critical task with reference to these men was but an anticipation of Hume.

The character of that philosophy which is called English has emerged in the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley. And that other English trait, the persistent holding to truths regarded vital, but which empiricism will not support, has also appeared in them. Locke, empiricist that he is, resolutely seeks to save

his precious world of matter, and his world of accountable spirits, whether or no. He will sacrifice his "system" sooner than sacrifice them. Berkeley, who is a more radical empiricist (strange as that sounds), does away with the mystic world of matter as inconceivable and redundant. But he cannot part with spirit, however weak he makes the answer of Euphranor to Hylas, who sees spirit, escorted by empirical logic, go the way of all substance. Berkeley, too, if driven to choose between his spirits and a rigidly consistent system, will save his spirits, and trust the system to God's almighty power of solving human contradictions.

Thus far we are in no position to see whether empiricism will really guarantee personality. The only way to discover this is rigidly to carry out empiristic epistemology without regard for the consequences to verities esteemed priceless by common sense or religious feeling. This carrying out we should have to do, even if there were not a Hume; for only in this way could our criticism reach any final worth. But Hume has done it for us; it is his great contribution to the history of philosophy; and it is in reminding ourselves of his work in this regard, that we shall elicit the best light that he, or the English school, can give us on the question of the philosophic bases of personality.

I have just mentioned Hylas, of Berkeley's famed *Dialogues*. It is not until the third edition that this objection occurs to Hylas: "You acknowledge that you have, properly, no idea of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit, nevertheless that there is a spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter, or reject Spirit" (Vol. I, p. 449). Berkeley can "answer"

this objection; but only by abandoning his empiristic ground, even more than he does in his actual attempt to answer it. Hume, who will not abandon his empiristic ground, since he sees none other, condemns the whole doctrine of substance as a doctrine with no meaning.

For where, among all our "impressions," shall we find the impression of "substance"? Even the adherents of substance would not claim the existence of such an impression. Is substance, then, an idea? But "we have no perfect idea of anything but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of substance" (*Treatise,* p. 234). If any one object that perceptions cannot exist unless they "inhere" in something, it is enough to remind him that there is nothing in perceptions which calls for any theory of "inhesion,"—of which, indeed, we have no idea.

Hume is too precise a thinker to take refuge in Berkeley's "notion." To him, with his premises, such a "notion" is merely a verbal makeshift, philosophically meaningless. As empiricists, we must be content to see that "nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions"; and all the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, Impressions and Ideas,—the latter being faint images of the former. Our knowledge is limited by our discrete perceptions; any going beyond them as such is an unwarranted leap into darkness. Such a leap is the leap to Substance.

But surely I have a "self," I *am* a self, that continues through changes invariably the same, maintaining perfect identity! Hume treats this question in detail in his section, "Of Personal Identity," (*Treatise,* IV, vi), which is one of the ablest exhibitions in the entire *Treatise* of the logic of empiricism. It led to results which much perplexed Hume, and which were the occasion of notes in the Appendix, where the perplexity presents a problem confessedly beyond his solution.

That there is not any real idea of such a perduring self, Hume makes appear, in brief, from the following considerations: An idea that is "real" must originate in one impression; but no one has any impression *continuing invariably the same* through the whole course of his life. But it will be said that while the self is not any one impression, it is "that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a *reference.*" But what can we mean by such reference? Perceptions are particular, separate, and different, and may be considered as existing separately. Their existence needs no self as a *support* at any rate, as has been seen already. And if this is not the way in which perceptions are to be referred to a self, have they really any connection with a self? "For my part," says Hume, in his famous passage, "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself,* I always stumble on some particular perception or other. . . . I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, *and never can observe anything but the perception.*" Hume now proceeds to give as his conclusion, that the self can be said to be nothing but "a collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity."

The trouble is, says Hume, that we lose sight of the fact that these perceptions are, as such, distinct and separate, and we bind them together by the association of their ideas in the imagination, so that we suppose them united by a real bond. Yet, whatever identity we presume as a result of this is a fiction, for "the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects"; "even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas." The *imagination* introduces into its ideas the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation (the second we are not concerned with here); which render it easy to make a transition from one idea to another, and to confound a train of ideas thus

related with one continued object. It is not hard then to yield to the notion of a soul, or self, or substance, "to disguise the variation."

But, after all, memory is at the basis of personal identity, for it alone informs us of "the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions." The notion of causation itself finds its origin in memory; yet the notion of a chain of causes once attained, we can extend it beyond what we remember, and thus, at the same time, project our personal identity.

As for the alleged "simplicity" of the self, which Berkeley had defined as the basis for the argument to natural immortality, this, too, is merely a "feigned" union on principles analogous to those which have shown the identity of the self to be a feigned identity (*Treatise,* p. 263).

Of course if there is no self, the same yesterday, today and tomorrow, there is no such thing as "duty." And Hume accepted this consequence. Morals becomes *mores,* custom. Morals may be spelled "manners,"—no necessary law is involved. It is the same with the other verities essential to genuine personality. Whereas Locke and Berkeley thought that on the wings of experience we can fly into the regions of Immortality and God, the truth is that we cannot fly even into the nether regions of science.

After Hume has lost the self, experience cries for it again and Hume is at a loss what to do. His afterthought exclaims: "All my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. . . . Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty" (*Treatise,* pp. 635-6). Hume finds himself confronted with the strange contradiction that "experience" can give him no abiding self, and yet without an abiding self experience is seen to be impossi-

ble. For what we call our "real experience" is always past, however much we believe it to be vitally now. A presentation must last in order to be a presentation at all. So, that we may have faith in the reality of experience, the past object must be vindicated as real; *but only a changeless self can do this.* The whole question now turns on the reality of that self. But, asks Hume, what is this self? *Is* it at all? It is out of the reach of experience, so why should I say it is real? It is simply an inference, and what does the inference rest on? It rests on the ideas of resemblance and causality. Are these real ideas, or are they not, rather, artificial? The latter. So the self inferred is obviously an illusion. And now comes the surprising thing: experience itself is an illusion,—even the momentary presentation, for we have already seen that its very reality *presupposes a self.*

Now, what is the significance of all this to Hume? And, above all, what is its real significance? To Hume it means the impotence of an understanding put to rout, and all that he can do is to plead the privilege of a sceptic. In the concluding section of the First Book of the *Treatise,* he pictures himself as one plunged in deep despair and melancholy; as one who is "affrighted and confounded," fancying himself "some strange uncouth monster." And, above all, note, he feels his opinions "loosen and fall of themselves." That were a hint well worth the trusting, if Hume could have known it as a hint. If Hume has followed out his "opinions" logically, and if the inevitable result of this logical carrying out is, that the premises with which he started "loosen and fall of themselves," it means as complete a dialectical refutation of those premises as one could wish. This is precisely what Hume has accomplished,—*the dialectical refutation of empiricism.* He has shown that experience is not self-explaining; that, however real it is, it is not real enough. Berkeley is no judge as to where Locke's premises really lead, save with regard to matter; still less is Locke aware that the hidden name

of his limited knowledge is nescience. It is Hume who brought the English view to its conclusion.

But Hume did not comprehend the real import of what he had done. Apparently he did not apprehend the meaning of "dialectic" refutation. If he had, he would have seen that the logic of its movement would not allow him to remain in scepticism, but must lead him out of empiricism and its despair to a view which at last is triumphantly self-sustaining. Even from the wilderness of such destruction, there is a path that issues into the highway of affirmation.

True, Hume is cautious enough to suggest that his sceptical result need not be final; that "others perhaps" or himself, "upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile these contradictions" (*Treatise,* p. 636). What he did not see, was that "experience," refuting itself, was thereby calling out for something more than its mere self; that its very self-negation was a demand for the *a priori* cognizing self.

But there was to come one, of whom Hume was as a prophet in the wilderness,—one who would not undo Hume's work, but who would do the essential thing toward completing it. For Kant is the real successor of Hume. Even as in revealing the logic of empiricism throughout this essay, we were anticipating Hume, so, in showing empiricism's unavoidable implications of the *a priori,* we were anticipating Kant. It is in Kant that Hume's true significance comes to the surface.

Hume sees that it is the mind which supplies the relations we attribute to experience; but for this reason these relations are, for him, not objectively valid. We do not derive universal judgments from experience, and must not put into experience what experience does not of itself warrant. The ties we introduce into experience have their origin in the subjective imagination; they

all are to be explained by "association of ideas," which, in Hume, take the place of any synthetic principle,—if indeed, anything thus accidental and itself unexplained, can be remotely similar to a principle, let alone a synthetic principle. To empiricism, subjectivity means variability, privacy, and hence, lack of reality. Of course the habit of expectation, born of custom, is a most useful one,—but it is blind.

Had Kant known the Hume of the *Treatise,* he would have found half his work done. For Hume does discover what Kant will rediscover, that the linkages of experience come from the subject. But Kant will see also that these linkages need not be regarded as merely fictitious unless, like Hume, we persist in regarding objects as *things in themselves.* For the objects of experience are not things in themselves; they are *phenomena,* though real as phenomena. Hume, in spite of his caution, reaches his scepticism of the validity of the *a priori* linkages through the assumption of an outer world of things in themselves. Hume contrasts the mind with what we call an objective thing. Kant shows that there are subjective acts entering into the very constitution of every object as such. Hume is right, Kant virtually says, so far as he goes. But Hume cannot see that the subject can legislate over a world. Hume is correct so far as he sees that we do not *derive* universal judgments from experience; but the universal judgments are *in* experience, and without them no experience can be. With Kant, causality is no longer a fiction of the imagination, but an organic principle of reason. We are accustomed to speak of antecedent change as the "cause" of a succeeding change; but the real cause, the logical cause, is the *a priori* synthesis of the mind. "Customary" coherence is supplanted by "intellectual" coherence; *combination* supersedes mere *addition,* and experience emerges with an interpretable *meaning.*

Thus, however much Hume adheres to "mere" experience, Kant will show that this very experience is marvellously complex.

He will show that even mere perception involves the active coöperation of the mind; that categories are necessarily working in and through all Hume's thinking; that mere discrimination means the presence of the ultimate forms of discrimination; in short, that the Humean understanding is not quite human. There is a tacit *self*-consciousness in all consciousness. The self as transcending experience is assumed in the very disproof of it by experience. Even Hume's scepticism was due to his faith in the consistency of reason.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

It is in the light of the self-defeat of empiricism's person in Hume that the utter impotence of the English empirical method for the treatment of personality, now becomes clearly revealed. A self cannot be refuted by an epistemology that refutes itself; nor by such an epistemology can the self, or anything else be guaranteed. If Locke and Berkeley tried to guarantee it, it was as we have seen, only by forsaking their premises.

The English school makes a vicious identity in its tendency to lose philosophy in science,—just as it makes a vicious breach when it separates philosophy and religion. Pure observation has its place and description is good,—so long as it is not taken for ultimate explanation. Yet, we have seen that the English tendency, as expressed in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, has been to explain by description; to make empirical psychology perform the office of rational psychology; to give a static or structural instead of a dynamic or functional account of mind. Too often English thought would take the Kingdom of Heaven by violence. Too often it represents the tendency of Locke to seek to reduce the intelligible to the sensible, instead of transmuting the sensible into the intelligible. Modern thought begins with the study of nature; the tendency in England has been to end thought there. The "flower in the crannied wall," at least in its mere physical involvings, simply cannot "tell what God and man is." Personality is not a problem in physics; it is not an object of scientific consideration. All empiricism can prove is a person in time and space; and so no eternal, free, rational person. And it does not even prove a person in time and space,—for both time

and space are stolen. One cognizant of this inner dialectic of empiricism will not be deceived by those of more recent times who would derive the seemingly necessary ties of experience from the inheritance of ages of past experience. If this statement of derivation itself is taken as a judgment necessarily true, whence *that* necessity? And in any supposed succession of inheritances, time itself is assumed as a necessary fact. We should be in a position to see that minds cannot be the products of an evolutionary process, since minds must be presupposed to make such a process possible. Modern Pragmatism, or Humanism, with its reality larger than reason; with its end, source and measure of truth beyond reason, resting as it does on a "radical" empiricism utterly repudiating the *a priori,*—this we must perceive furnishes us no person, which can face the fire of the analysis of Hume and the criticism of Kant.

The best thing that Locke did was to fix the attention of English thought upon the problem of certitude. The real injury that has been done has resulted from the characteristically English reply to that problem,—the denial of certitude. It has come to pass that the Englishman is celebrated for his ontological agnosticism. In this regard, he is the doubting Thomas among the disciples of Truth; he must see and feel, forgetting that they are blessed who have not seen with eyes of sense, and yet have believed. The world of persons cannot be "seen." Perhaps the deep-seated trouble with the English school, even as in the case of Hume, its greatest representative, is *the utter ignoring of the logic of premises.*

Yet, let it be added, within the English school, as represented by Locke, Berkeley and Hume, there is an observable progress in the fortunes of the person. Berkeley makes a measurable advance over Locke when he gives us the idealistic statement indispensable to the proving of valid personality,—that spirits and their ideas make up the real. However, we have seen that

this was not sufficient, since Berkeley lost his minds in Mind. Above all, while the announcement was idealistic, the premises were empiristic,—the foundation would not support the superstructure. So, though Hume guarantees no self at all, still his is an advance over Berkeley, for he has shown what will *not* guarantee personality, and has forever revealed the futility of the empiristic attempt. Deeply seen, as has been insisted, the whole progress from Locke to Hume is the progress in empiricism's self-dissolution. Yet in spite of the fact that it is dissolution, it is a progress in the interests of personality because only of this dissolution could be born the supports of real personality. The dissolution must be reached before Kant will emerge. Kant builds on Hume. And on the foundations Kant laid, must be reared the superstructure of an adequate doctrine of ethical personality.

So the attempts of Locke and Berkeley to vindicate the spirit must never be considered futile; the attempt of each is a necessary, although insufficient element in whatever achievement shall be acclaimed as ultimate with regard to personality and its philosophic basis.

The threefold aim of this essay as previously defined, must herewith be regarded as attained. It has presented in detail the treatment of personality by Locke, Berkeley and Hume; it has shown the explicit and implicit assumptions of the *a priori* in that treatment and has exhibited by an illustrative dialectic in the case of each thinker and in the succession as a whole the gradual and final self-dissolution of empiricism in its specific attempt to guarantee personality, and the necessity of the *a priori* for any personality such as they tried to guarantee and such as is adequate for ethics.

Finally, although, in the treatment of personality by Locke, Berkeley and Hume, we have come upon results largely and unavoidably negative, it is thoroughly unjust to suppose that in

these negative results the practical temper either of these thinkers or of the English people is adequately reflected. There is a deep religious earnestness native to the English mind which ever holds practically to the great verities, even where theory fails. The very cutting loose from traditions, eminently characteristic of the thinkers we have been considering, is, in a deep sense, faith in the individual and in his validity! English institutions eloquently point in the same direction. It is the same with English poetry, where George S. Morris says we find the best English philosophy, from Spenser, influenced by the Platonic revival, and Shakespeare, "the poet of the moral order," to Tennyson, with his message of "self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control."

It is Philonous who says to Hylas, as his parting words, "You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose, its ascent as well as descent proceeding from the same uniform law or principle. . . . Just so, the same principles which, at first view, lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common-sense." In a deeper and better sense than even Berkeley knew, this loosely symbolizes English philosophy coming to its own. When it really shall have come to its own, it will have consciously achieved the inevitable dialectical advance to a recognition of the problem of the person as the one problem where empiricism crucially defeats itself and in the triumph of that defeat lifts the person beyond mere experience.

And then English philosophy will no longer be insular.

CHAPTER VIII

SUGGESTIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION

While the exact scope of the present task is now complete, and while it is obviously far outside the limits of the undertaking to attempt such a metaphysical superstructure as would give a complete doctrine of ethical personality upon the logical foundation dialectically revealed to be necessary, I cannot refrain from appending a few remarks announcing the general outlines which I think such a superstructure would logically define. These remarks are to be taken only in the sense of an architect's tentative and yet thoroughly indicative ground-plan. *That* the person knows *a priori*, and *what* the person supremely knows purely as such an *a priori* knower,—these are to give us the vindication, the only vindication there is, of an ethical world.

Persons are not ultimately free and responsible in the world of efficient causation, because science can tolerate no exceptions to the universal causal nexus. The iron necessity which rules things, rules minds also. In the language of evolution, persons also are "products," and, in the last resort, are what they are because they cannot be otherwise. But the person as a knower *a priori* is the very *source* of that necessity which he discovers in nature, and thus is not determined by that necessity. So far, this is akin to the negative freedom for which Kant contended,—although it is a misnomer if by "negative" is meant merely negative freedom, for the heart of its meaning is the positive and active legislation of the self over its own world. The self, thus, is not the product of a process, but is that which makes the process possible. Or, from the standpoint of the apriority of Time, we see that the person, who indeed makes events pos-

sible, is not himself a mere event. He himself cannot be a process with beginning and end; a beginning and end presuppose Time, and hence presuppose the person.

Thus the person can have neither an origin nor an end. He is uncreated either by natural processes or by the fiat of God. He is more than "everlasting",—he is super-temporal, eternal. We have escaped that temporal creationism of the old theologies, which was so in conflict with any genuine ethical freedom and responsibility, despite traditional attempts to effect reconciliation. For anything created must be in Time and must be efficiently caused, and a rigid logic must trace the final responsibility for what he is to his Maker.

Again, the validating of a person as free means the guaranteeing of his power to know, and to form judgments that are necessary. Now, without the *a priori* knower, there is no attainment of necessary judgments. But as was noted in the discussion of Locke, the denial of the *a priori* support for induction in the world of science is the denial of the attainment of absolute necessity in the realm of natural law, and means the utter paralysis of calculable action, and thus sounds the death of freedom. Experience loses all power of teaching. And no one can be morally responsible for carrying out a purpose in a world, however rational, whose rationality he cannot fathom.

Thus far the *free* person means the *rational* person; and a completely rational person, a knower *a priori,* is one who holds within himself the eternal sources of knowledge. But, now, even the moral ideal of such a person, if there be a moral ideal, and if the person *know* it, must be an ideal arising out of the demands of his own rational nature as such; for, carried out consistently, this is precisely what it means to know *a priori.* If he can know his ideal at all, he knows it as his own rational creation,—it is not a mandate thrust upon him from without, willy-nilly,—the "ought" which it commands is autonomous. If such a self

does really recognize such an ideal, it is at least within the demands of that rational freedom which calls for rational autonomy. This could be made clear by asking not only concerning the *fact and nature* of *a priori* cognition, but concerning *what* the *a priori* knower, as such, fundamentally knows. One more condition that must be fulfilled before we can have a genuinely free person: The deeper reason why persons, regarded as mere products of evolution were thought of as absolutely determined is that they were caught in that thoroughly monistic cosmic whole, from the bond of whose causal nexus there was no escape. Now, the important thing to note is that, so far as the freedom of the person is concerned, it makes no difference in principle whether the monism affirmed is spiritual or material. The ultimate reality, and so the freedom, of the person is lost in the premising of any monism, whatsoever kind it is. Monism, with its engulfing One, erases the individual as *ultimately* real,—which is the same as to deny him ultimate freedom, ultimate moral responsibility. He is not *self*-active, for all self-activity is lost in the ultimate originative activity of his "ground". Like Spinoza's flying stone come to sudden consciousness, he may think he is free; but the thought is born of ignorance, and his deepest freedom is to realize that he has none. If the individual is ultimately reducible to a One and All, then there is only one being that is not extraneously determined, and it is that One and All, who is self-determined. *If a person is not ultimately real, he is determined by what is.*

How will the fact, the nature, or even the deliverances of *a priori* cognition help us to maintain the reality of the individual thinker, and so vindicate him as a thinker self-originating, self-active, self-determining?

First, he is at least a knower, a thinker,—that we have rightly taken to be his essence, and as such we have been considering him all along. Now, this self, which we call essen-

tially a "knowing", or a "thinking", Descartes was somewhat familiar with, and he laid the foundations of modern idealism when he showed, with however much inadequate appreciation, that the supreme fact which, of all facts, can dialectically maintain itself, is the reality of the thinking which I call "I". Thinking is the one thing in the universe of thought which is self-sustaining. The true Brahma is the thinking which can say: "When me they fly, I am the wings." Thinking cannot unthink itself. *Thinking is ultimately real,* and such an eternal thinking which is thus proved is *a thinking which is a priori in the deepest sense of that term, since, as ultimately real, it furnishes the conditions not only of all knowing, but of all that can be known,*—it furnishes that which is logically "prior" to any experience whatsoever.

Am I a self-active Thinking of this sort? Again, is there only one, or are there many such self-active Thinkings? In asking the first question, I answer it; for if I think that I am not a self-active Thinking, my thought—I—*maintains itself* as precisely that which I momentarily and only formally deny it to be. I, at least, am ultimately real, self-active and free in that sense. But am I the only self or person of this kind? Again the question answers itself. I can think identity only in terms of difference; and if I think of my identity in terms of a *real* difference, it must be in terms of *another ego as real as the only reality has dialectically been proved to be,—as real as I am as a self-active thinker,*—in other words, I define myself only in terms of another, the genus of the definition being self-active thinking. So far, this is clear: *I am a person only as I recognize others as persons,* and thus as ultimately real as am I.

Referring again to Descartes, we now see how fundamentally he was right,—and how fundamentally he was wrong. Descartes was right in so far as he showed that the fundamental thought is the thought "I". The thinking self is the one "kernel

of reality" which can be husked out of the "shell of conception." So, we cannot agree with Arthur Hugh Clough when he says:

"It fortifies my soul to know
That though I perish, truth is so."

Bad poetry, and worse logic, for there is no truth if there is no real "I." Truth is always thought; thought is always an individual act. In a way, Descartes sees this. But while truth is always an individual act, it is an act which expresses universality and unites me with other minds. There is a tendency in idealism toward solipsism. Descartes shuts himself up in himself and then vainly tries to prove existence outside himself. He can get no further than his ideas. In that sense, and in that sense only, Bain is pertinent when he facetiously remarks, regarding the *Cogito ergo sum,* that he is "of the opinion that we should cease endeavoring to extract sunbeams from that cucumber" (*Dissertations,* p. 8). Descartes should have seen that when I think "I" "distinctly", I think in distinction to the reality of other minds. All distinction implies a genus or kind, —a background of kind and other species of the same kind. Rationality is the kind. Every rational consciousness necessarily conceives itself in terms of contrast with other selves. Ego thinks itself in terms of non-*this*-ego, and not in terms of utter *non-ego*. Logical consciousness is always generic, and means an intelligent community of selves recognizing each other.

Such an argument is not entirely foreign to that of Leibniz, when, considering substance as "living activity", he maintains that substance, exercising an activity, is essentially an "excludent" power,—a power that excludes others. But this argument is fraught with metaphor, as are most of Leibniz' metaphysical arguments. My position is more in accord with the conception of personality maintained in the metaphysical theory of Personal Idealism as announced and defended by Professor G. H. Howison in his *Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays.*

I know *a priori;* this is my essence; I am not alone: so far, the argument has been intent upon indicating that the very nature of persons as knowers, as thinkers, maintains their ultimate reality,—their underivative, self-active, self-defining and so eternally free, character, as against all solipsisms and monisms which make correlation more real than the things correlated. This fundamental judgment of self-recognition in terms of others, with its logical implications, *is what the person fundamentally knows as an a priori knower, and is at the basis of all other knowledge whatsoever, and so is the basal import of all logical judgment as such.*

A thorough-going metaphysics of personality, logically carried out into detail, must show the precise relation between the unit-thinking called "I" and the categories which move throughout all thinking as modes of that unit-thinking,—how these particular modes of synthesis directly refer to that ultimate synthesis which we call a self, which fundamentally judges in the manner that has been shown. This would involve a new deduction of the categories and, again with reference to Kant, a bridging of the unlucky chasm between the Theoretical and Practical Reasons. The fundamental significance of even Kant's apriorism is the grounding of the order of the world in the spontaneous Unity of the perceiving self.

So far, we have restricted our search for the ethical person to the search for the *free* person. What we have thus far discovered might be put into some such general definition as this: *A person is a self-active, self-defining and so self-differentiating, intelligence.* Such a person, in so far, fulfils the conditions of that free personality which we seek. But is this sufficient to guarantee us the free person with all of his ethical significance? He is free, but free for what? Is his freedom simply this splendid freedom of abstract membership in a rational democracy where each is sovereign? What, indeed, does it mean in the full

to call it a *rational* democracy? Let us consider the strictly logical implications and demands which reside in the personality so far indicated. Let us see in what sense, if any, our world of persons is *moral,* and so how the person may be truly called morally free.

The genus of self-definition, I said, is self-active rationality. What is the differentia? You and I are self-active intelligences, but what is the difference between you and me, logically speaking? We may dismiss the answer that there is no difference, for then the self-definition that has been argued is made impossible; the law of the "identity of indiscernibles" would reduce others to me, and the impossibility of a logic of affirmation without a real negation would reduce me to nought. But whatever else might be said, this fact of fundamental ethical importance is unquestionably true: if persons are different by their very self-definition, it also follows that no two persons can be perfect. Perfection will not allow of differing degrees. If the genus against which different persons define themselves is "self-active rationality" as such, it follows that the differentia inevitably means some departure from this rationality. *Complete rationality,* perfect rationality, ideal being, no person but one can have, since the Fulfilled has no degrees. There are no two perfects. But if self-definition of all the rest is real, the ground of definition must be equally real;—there is at least this one supremely real self-active Thinking. On the other hand, the difference between persons—between you and me—is precisely a difference in approximation toward this perfect, an approximation, too, which may become more and more if, and only if, that aspect of the self which is in a world of events or of possible progress is determined by the eternally constitutive, that is, *a priori,* nature of the self,—a thing which has already been dwelt upon as the inevitable outcome of Hume's dialectic, read aright. Thus, for one to define himself and freely to be himself

by that very self-definition, is to recognize others as equally real *and freely to define a perfect self, an Ideal, as the mandatory goal of all changing experience; this, in truth, is the creation of a self, which, a priori, constitutes and thus controls his own experience.* This necessary and yet spontaneous recognition of the Perfect Person introduces *values* into the world of persons, transforming as it does the world of mere change into a world of progress. The supreme cause becomes the logically final cause, which in turn is what we must deeply mean as the "moral ideal." The search for the free person at last leads us to the finding of the ethical person, which we suddenly discover to guarantee not only freedom, but every other conception we are accustomed to call ethical; yes, not only are these conceptions guaranteed, they are absolutely demanded. We come upon the insight that the person reached is not needed merely if the fundamental notions of ethics are to be assumed; but if just this conception of the person is discovered as an absolutely logical necessity if we are to have any reality at all, the ethical notions merely assumed are necessarily involved and justified, and must find their place in an adequate ethical theory, their place being determined by the nature of the world which has been proved their justification. In finding the freedom we sought, we find the conception also of an *ideal,* which is indeed the Ideal Person. We find, too, a world of *obliged* persons who live in a world of values expressed in terms of *right* and *wrong.* We have not far to seek for a justification and criterion for a doctrine of *happiness;* and *egoism* and *altruism* are now plainly seen to be complementary conceptions. The working out of these concepts in detail in connection with their ground is foregone here, but we must be aware that instead of an excursion into metaphysics by the way of epistemology proving unethical, it leads us to the very heart of ethics. Indeed, ethics and ontology meet in the doctrine of the person. Incidentally, logic as well as morality is shown in-

compatible with such anti-monisms as are either atheistic or irrationally anarchic. The universe is rational. Each thinks his own world, but not capriciously therefore, but with primary reference to the equally spontaneous and other-referred thought of all the rest. The universe is still a universe, not a multiverse, but it is made one by final, not efficient causation.

Further, the unity and interdependence of ethical notions is now not only suspected, but really discerned. For the search for the justification of one ethical notion, freedom, gradually involves all the rest; each implies the rest through the one validating ground. Thus, thoroughly to prove one ethical notion, in howsoever an attenuated sense, is to demand not only its own completed meaning, but the completed meaning of the whole circle of ethical concepts.

Further, with a complete doctrine of the Ethical Person we should have an obvious criterion for approaching all inadequate ethical systems from the trivial Aristippian type to the modern social rationalisms such as those of Kant and of Hegel. The dialectical refutation of each could be shown to result in the last resort from a merely partial and thus self-defeating conception of ethical personality. For instance, the egoistic hedonism of Aristippus, or even of Epicurus, could be shown to demand not only the incomplete conception of the person as happy, but of the person as rational before even the former is possible. The cosmocratic rigorism of the Stoics could be shown as at the last annulling its own agents by the final sacrifice of the individual to external law, and thus, again, crying for its own modification in a law compatible with the possibility of agents, which, in turn, make a law possible. Egoistic rationalism, such as the æsthetic self-realization of Plato, would be seen to pass over of itself into a rationalism that is social. This task would form an excellent key to a thoroughly logical history of ethics. As one's criticism approached

modern times, one would find this encouraging fact: that the essential spirit of modern philosophy is discovered in the growing realization of the fullness, and, in a certain sense, the supremacy of the individual. It is this tendency toward an interpretation of reality in terms of individuality that places the modern in broad contrast with the ancient, who was prone to lose the consciousness of the individual in the universal. Without being too dogmatic, it seems just to say that, in the largest and most important sense, whatever progress is deeply discerned in the history of philosophy, or of ethics proper, is to be measured in terms of the consistent development of a doctrine of personality.

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